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THE CLOSING OF THE ETHER:  
COMMUNICATION POLICY AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1921-1926 
 
 
SETH ASHLEY* 
 
 
 
How do media systems come to be structured in different ways? Through a 
comparative historical institutional analysis of the origins of broadcasting policy 
in the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth century, this study 
examines reasons that private, commercial interests dominated the U.S. system 
while Britain granted a monopoly to the publicly funded, noncommercial BBC. 
Policy outcomes at this critical juncture were contingent on different path-
dependent notions of the public interest as well as temporal sequencing. Through 
an analysis of primary documents and secondary literature, this study considers 
the implications of these different approaches for modern communication policy 
and democratic society. 
 
 
 
 Critical discussions of the structure and function of media systems often 
center on the notion that there is nothing inherently natural about the way media 
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systems develop over time.1 Rather, media systems evolve due to deliberate and 
accidental policies and practices that exist within social and political contexts. 
Once certain paths are selected, policy outcomes can have lasting effects. But 
how does this process unfold, and what factors lead to different outcomes? 
Following previous research that has identified the origins of broadcast 
media as a major critical juncture in the history of communication,2 this study 
presents a comparative historical institutional analysis of the origins of 
broadcasting policy in the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth 
century. Although the countries are fundamentally similar, they took notably 
different approaches to structuring and regulating broadcast media. In the 
United States, private, commercial media were fully institutionalized in the 
1930s, while in Britain, the noncommercial, publicly funded BBC held a 
monopoly. How could two similar nations, sharing the same ostensible concern 
                                                        
1 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (1989); 
DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND 
POLITICS 2 (2004); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA: U.S. COMMUNICATION 
POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 18 (2004); PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL 
ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 1-2 (2004).  
2 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATION, MASS MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE 
BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993); SUSAN SMULYAN, SELLING 
RADIO: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1920-1934 (1994); THOMAS 
STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1996). 
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for the public interest, produce such drastically different outcomes? How did 
different conceptions of the public interest shape these early broadcasting policy 
outcomes? Through an analysis of primary sources and secondary literature, this 
study examines the origins of broadcast policy in the 1920s, from the emergence 
of broadcasting as a popular medium in 1921 up to the institutionalization of 
modern policy structures in 1927, in an attempt to better understand how today’s 
media landscape came to be and to consider how media systems can be best 
equipped to enhance democratic practices. 
The goals of the study are to synthesize existing literature, uncover 
additional primary source detail to supplement the rich body of work that 
already exists, and make a useful case comparison that helps illustrate and 
explain divergent policy outcomes. This historical analysis will show that 
although both systems represent a top-down process of closing the ether to new 
entrants as power was concentrated, the outcomes exemplified and hinged on 
two radically different conceptions of the role of the state in regulating media. 
Where the American design was dominated by capitalist concerns for profit and 
growth, the British outcome was better able to preserve democratic impulses. 
The public-interest concept that guided the American outcome was embedded in 
a market orientation and gave preference to industry and economic concerns, 
while the British outcome was motivated by paternalistic notions of public 
service, which treated broadcasting more like a utility designed to bring quality 
content to citizens. Notably, both countries avoided the more extreme options: a 
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free-market property rights solution on one hand and a total government 
takeover on the other. Both systems have seen changes since their origins, but 
these early designs still resonate strongly today. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
All the modern social sciences – and especially sociology – were originally 
a response to the effects of the industrialization and commercialization of society 
in the nineteenth century.3 Through a range of methods, scholars have attempted 
to understand and provide explanations for the drastic changes that took place 
during this time. Historical sociology is one of the earliest and most enduring 
forms of knowledge production, as it allows scholars to focus their attention on 
big questions about the nature of society, social processes, and social institutions 
over time. Some of the most significant scholarly works of the past century 
employ this method as they examine a range of topics including the rise of the 
welfare state, class formation, economic development, social revolutions and 
political organization.4 Studies in this tradition can be broadly interpretive or 
causal and analytical and can seek to make modest empirical claims and 
generalizations. These studies typically rely on a small number of cases, which 
allows for the kind of deep, contextualized analysis that is often lacking and 
                                                        
3 See Theda Skocpol, Sociology’s Historical Imagination, in VISION AND METHOD IN 
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 1-21, (Theda Skocpol, ed., 1984). 
4 For an overview of major works, see chapters 2 through 10 in SKOCPOL, id. 
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indeed often impossible in quantitative research, especially that which relies on 
cross-national comparisons based on statistical analyses.5 
Based on this sociological approach, this article combines historical 
comparison with institutional analysis. The case comparison seeks to “explore 
alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas and 
evidence,”6 and the institutionalist approach examines relationships between 
state and society to see how patterns of behavior become structured and carried 
out by individuals and groups.7 As Theda Skocpol notes, “[B]ringing the state 
and state-society relationships to the fore in the definition of important, 
substantive problems for research, and in the search for explanatory 
hypotheses,” has helped to identify “the interconnections of institutions and 
organizations that other scholars tended to treat separately from one another.”8 
Within this institutionalist context, an emphasis on path dependency highlights 
                                                        
5 See, e.g., SKOCPOL, supra note 4; JAMES MAHONEY & DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, 
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2003). 
6 CHARLES C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD: MOVING BEYOND QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES viii (1987). 
7 See, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES AND HUGE COMPARISONS 
(1984); Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in 
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1-32 (Sven 
Steinmo ed., 1992); Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 936 (1996).  
8 Theda Skocpol, Why I am a Historical-Institutionalist, 28 POLITY 103, 103 (Fall 1995). 
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the temporal element of processes that often exhibit considerable stability until 
times of change, when decisions are made, paths are selected and alternatives are 
pushed aside. The goal is to formulate explanations for the development of state 
and social structures that reflect the instability of human relations and the fluid 
nature of socially constructed norms.  
Thus, this study looks to the past to identify and examine the “critical 
junctures” or “switch-points” that led to certain communication policy 
outcomes.9 The path-dependent nature of media systems means that the 
outcomes produced at these critical junctures have a significant impact on a 
system’s future.10 In the origins of broadcasting, we can see taking shape 
different modern conceptions of public and private, of individual and society, 
and of the proper role of the state. Today, similar policy debates surround 
regulation of the Internet and other digital technologies as we find ourselves in 
another critical juncture in communication history. 
                                                        
9 See Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POLITICS 341 (2007); Kathleen 
Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
369 (1999). 
10 On path dependence, see PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS AND 
SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & 
SOCIETY 507 (2000); W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE 
ECONOMY (1994). 
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This study also takes cues from critical and cultural studies in 
communication policy research, and follows the approach described by Willard 
D. Rowland Jr.11 Studies of communication and telecommunication policy and 
history often rely on “formalistic legal analysis of the relevant laws, 
administrative agency decisions, and judicial rulings with an emphasis on 
questions of constitutionality, process or precedence.”12 This study, like 
Rowland’s, views policy debates and documents “as social and political texts 
subject to quite different readings, as socially created documents subject to 
interpretation in much the same way as are literary and other cultural texts.”13 
The historical comparative analysis of broadcasting origins presented here 
broadens Rowland’s approach to include American and British life and, thus, 
centers on the state as the unit of analysis with attention to the legal codification 
of the public interest relevant to broadcasting policy and the institutional context 
for that development. Ultimately, this research aims to address a central 
question: How did different cultural conceptions of the “public interest” shape 
early broadcasting policy outcomes in the United States and Great Britain? 
For this project, the collection of data was an iterative process between 
primary and secondary sources.  There was also heavy reliance on secondary 
                                                        
11 Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Meaning of ‘The Public Interest’ in Communications Policy, 
Part I: Its Origins in State and Federal Regulation, 2 COMM. L. & POL’Y 309 (1997). 
12 Id. at 313. 
13 Id. 
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sources in constructing a narrative surrounding the time period analyzed, 
perhaps more heavily than some historians would tolerate, but this is part of 
what makes the historical comparative approach possible. A large amount of 
data is needed to attempt to forge a comprehensive narrative and an adequate 
explanation for questions such as the ones at hand. For this reason, it is common 
for works of historical sociology to lean heavily on previous research in 
synthesizing explanations. As Skocpol argues:  
 
[A] dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every 
investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-
historical research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research—and if 
excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion—
secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a 
given study.14 
 
To be sure, this comparison of broadcasting origins is a big topic, and excellent 
studies by specialists are indeed available in profusion. I am fortunate to be able 
to make use of those works in the analysis that follows. 
 
SELECTION OF CASES 
                                                        
14 Theda Skocpol, Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies, in SKOCPOL, supra note 3, 382. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
8 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
Why does Great Britain provide a good comparison in understanding and 
explaining U.S. communication policy? What sort of comparative leverage is 
gained through this approach? For a successful comparative analysis, it is 
important to have an appropriate mix of similarities and differences. If cases are 
too similar or too different, comparative analysis can be ineffective in generating 
useful evidence and explanation.15 The British and American media systems are 
appropriate for comparative analysis due to an attractive blend of similarities 
and differences in both modern and historical incarnations. Other scholars have 
tended to agree, as historical analyses of one system often rely on comparisons 
with the other.16 
Broadly, in their modern contexts, the British and American media 
systems are often considered quite similar when compared to those of the rest of 
the world. Both systems enjoy relatively similar press freedom and legal 
restrictions, and both systems exist within relatively similar market economies.17 
As such, both systems fall within Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini’s 
conceptualization of the “North Atlantic or Liberal” media system model, which 
contrasts with the “Polarized Pluralist Model” of the Mediterranean region and 
the “Democratic Corporatist Model” of north and central Europe. “The Liberal 
                                                        
15 See MAHONEY & RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 5. 
16 See, e.g., ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1966); ASA 
BRIGGS, THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1961).  
17 See HALLIN & MANCINI, supra note 1. 
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Model is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of 
commercial media” even though there is “considerable variation among 
countries” grouped together.18 In one of the central differences, public 
broadcasting in general receives a much larger audience share in the United 
Kingdom, where the organizational and institutional structure of the BBC and its 
long history helps to set the British media system apart.  
Hallin and Mancini describe the British model for the regulation of 
broadcasting as the “professional model,” in which “a strong tradition developed 
that broadcasting should be largely insulated from political control and run by 
broadcasting professionals.”19 Other broadcasting systems that exemplify this 
model include the Canadian Broadcasting Company, Irish public broadcasting, 
and some Scandinavian countries. Hallin and Mancini suggest that public 
broadcasting in the United States also fits within this model, but it is a much 
smaller part of the overall American media system as compared to the BBC in 
Britain. Of course, both media systems have experienced change over time. 
National public broadcasting did not exist in the United States until the 1960s, 
just as the British media landscape began to change in the 1950s with the 
introduction of commercial broadcasting and the Independent Television 
Authority, created by the Television Act of 1954.20 Today, both countries can be 
                                                        
18 Id. at 11. 
19 Id. at 31. 
20 TELEVISION ACT OF 1954, 2 & 3 ELIZ. 2, C. 55. 
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characterized as mixed systems, although the American system remains much 
less mixed than the British.  
In their historical contexts, the two countries share a common cultural 
heritage under the British crown, but the American Revolution also represents a 
significant departure from this heritage.21 The timeline is not the same, but both 
countries experienced relatively similar processes of democratization, and both 
countries experienced the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, first in 
Britain then later in America, eventually giving rise to working and middle 
classes as well as similar social structures.22 Culturally, the late nineteenth 
century saw the growth of similar protectionist movements in both countries, as 
evidenced by Victorian ideals of service in Britain and Progressive Era reforms in 
the United States.23 And the long tradition of British paternalism, originating 
during the Tudor and Stuart eras, actually has a kind of analogue in American 
republicanism as espoused by such thinkers as Walter Lippmann.24 Politically, 
British parliamentary democracy is not the same as American republican 
democracy, but in that they are both Western, industrialized democracies, they 
                                                        
21 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11-92 (1992).  
22 See PHILIP NORTON, THE BRITISH POLITY (2nd ed. 1991); E. P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF 
THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1964). 
23 See PADDY SCANNELL & DAVID CARDIFF, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH BROADCASTING 9 
(1991). See also LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1914 (2001). 
24 WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922). 
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are appropriate for comparative analysis. With regard to media and 
communications, the two countries are historically similar in that they both 
developed similar publishing and telecommunication industries and experienced 
similar levels of press freedom. Generally, the United States and Great Britain 
and their respective media systems have an appropriate blend of similarities and 
differences in both their modern and historical contexts to make them well suited 
to comparative analysis. 
 
THE AMERICAN APPROACH: SERVING THE MARKET 
Much has been written about the history of both American and British 
broadcasting.25 Before Erik Barnouw’s work in the 1960s, U.S. broadcasting 
histories often focused on the triumphs of industry and technology.26 Barnouw 
introduced the idea that the American commercial broadcasting system had 
“never been formally adopted.”27 This line of inquiry has since been pursued by 
a number of other scholars seeking to revise previously unquestioned accounts 
and incorporate critical analysis. Philip T. Rosen paid attention to the early 
battles over control for wireless technology that took place between the Navy, 
the Post Office and the Department of Commerce, and considered alternative 
                                                        
25 See, e.g., BARNOUW, supra note 16; BRIGGS, supra note 16. 
26 See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 (1938). 
27 BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 281. 
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types of broadcast systems that were clearly available as radio evolved.28 The late 
1980s and 1990s brought a flurry of broadcasting histories, including Susan 
Douglas’s important study of the period from 1899-1922, which brought to light 
the conflicting visions for broadcasting propagated in the press by inventors, 
amateurs and businessmen, who competed to have their visions dominate the 
popular imagination.29 Douglas concluded that this period is when the real 
debates over the structure of American broadcasting were settled, years before 
the first Radio Act was written into law.30 
Thomas Streeter agreed with this assessment and built on the story by 
placing broadcasting in the context of corporate liberalism and clarifying the 
contradictions inherent in broadcast policy.31 He wrote: 
 
The effort to create a free open marketplace has produced an institution 
that is dependent on government privileges and other forms of collective 
constraints. Although constructed in the name of the classical ideals of 
private property and the free marketplace, American commercial 
                                                        
28 PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, 1920-1934 (1980). 
29 SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1922 (1987). 
30 Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
31 STREETER, supra note 2. 
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broadcasting, under close inspection, calls the coherence of those ideals 
into question.32 
 
Susan Smulyan concentrated on the rise of commercialism from 1920 to 1934,33 
and Hugh Slotten argued that broadcasting had been viewed as a technical 
problem to be managed efficiently by the regulation of structure, not content or 
ownership.34 Slotten wrote: “Individuals were probably for the most part 
unaware that by applying technocratic principles to policy making about radio 
and television standards, especially by attempting to reduce issues to narrow 
technical facts, they were indirectly supporting corporate liberal principles.”35 
Another major contribution came in the form of Robert W. McChesney’s analysis 
of media reformers who, in the 1920s and 1930s, resisted the dominant approach 
to broadcasting and advocated for educational and noncommercial stations.36 
His focus on the period from 1928 to 1935 suggests that the debates over 
structure were hardly settled until the commercial system was finally 
institutionalized in the Communication Act of 1934. 
                                                        
32 Id. at xii-xiii. 
33 Smulyan, supra note 2. 
34 HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1920-1960 (2000). 
35 Id. at 237. 
36 MCCHESNEY, supra note 2. 
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 Rowland’s article in the Journal of Communication Law and Policy is perhaps 
most relevant here. Rowland describes the uses of the “public interest” standard 
in other applications prior to the advent of broadcasting and concludes that the 
standard always had a clear pro-industry meaning.37 When applied to 
broadcasting, the standard was intended first and foremost to protect the 
economic interests of private companies. The American approach to 
broadcasting “drew on the notion of natural monopoly” but “ensured that 
communication services would be commercial rather than governmental.”38 The 
Communication Act of 1934 would ultimately go out of its way to separate mass 
media and common carrier, where mass media would describe the private 
commercial operations that would dominate the airwaves and common carrier 
would be the classification for utility services such as the telephone that would 
provide equal access to all citizens.39  
Despite evidence that seems to indicate an easy victory for industry forces 
in the battle to control radio, scholars have noted that it is actually remarkable 
that the United States was alone in the world in creating a private broadcasting 
                                                        
37 Rowland, supra note 11, at 328.  
38 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATION POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 14 (1999). 
39 This is the distinction between Title II and Title III, on which the current FCC’s ruling 
on net neutrality hinges. The Internet remains classified as a mass medium rather than a common 
carrier, suggesting a preference to industry interests over public service. 
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industry; in many other nations, the state retained control of the broadcasting 
system or created significant independent public broadcasting corporations.40 
Yet since the origins of broadcasting, the intricacies of communications policy 
have come as much from business strategies as from government.41 Even in the 
early days of broadcasting, regulators were disinclined to regulate in order to 
avoid accusations of government censorship.42 In sum, media policy-making in 
the United States always has been an intensely political process with no 
guaranteed winners or losers. 
 
THE BRITISH APPROACH: “THE BRUTE FORCE OF MONOPOLY” 
Scholarship surrounding the history of British broadcasting almost cannot 
help but place itself in the context of American broadcasting, whether discussing 
similarities or differences. For example, Asa Briggs pointed out the contrast in 
the evolution of the two systems:  
                                                        
40 See Huseyin Leblebici, et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of 
Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry, 36 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 333 (1991); Herman S. Hettinger & William A. Porter, Radio Regulation: A Case 
Study in Basic Policy Conflicts, 221 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 122 (1942).  
41 See Harold D. Lasswell, Communications Research and Public Policy, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 
301 (1972); Jan van Cuilenburg & Denis McQuail, Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: Toward a New 
Communications Policy Paradigm, 18 EUR. J. OF COMM. 181 (2003). 
42 Erik Barnouw, Historical Survey of Communications Breakthroughs, 34 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 13, 16 (1982). 
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Eventually the British and American broadcasting systems were to be so 
completely different — one based on a concept of “public service,” the 
other fully integrated into the business system — that in all controversies 
about the place of radio in society they were to be taken as the two chief 
contrasting types.43 
 
However, this was only true in the later years of the evolution. Earlier, the two 
systems were not so different. “In both countries there were the same pressures 
and the same outspoken advocates of common ideas and comparable 
institutions,”44 Briggs wrote. Ultimately, the outcome in Britain was quite 
different.  
John Reith led the British Broadcasting Company from its origins as a 
heavily regulated private monopoly in 1922 through its shift to a public 
corporation operating under royal charter in 1927.   Until he stepped down in 
1938, he was perhaps the lead proponent of or at least the best known advocate 
for the preservation of a noncommercial system of broadcasting in Britain. In a 
1949 Report of the British Broadcasting Committee, Reith articulated the manner 
in which this preservation was accomplished:  
 
                                                        
43 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 59. 
44 Id. 
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 It was the brute force of monopoly that enabled the BBC to become what it 
 did, and to do what it did; that made it possible for a policy of moral 
 responsibility to be followed. If there is to be competition it will be of 
 cheapness not of goodness. The usual disadvantages and dangers of 
 monopoly do not apply to Broadcasting; it is in fact a potent incentive.45 
 
The “brute force” employed by the leaders of the BBC was their solution to the 
paradox of democracy, in which rational, informed policies and practices can be 
difficult to come by when irrational, uninformed approaches to problems carry 
just as much weight.  
 Reith sought to reconcile this dilemma, and his approach to democracy 
that earned him and the BBC charges of elitism and paternalism:  
 
There must be some principle of ethics or economics to justify equality of 
electoral power to an intelligent, responsible, respectable citizen, a 
producer by hand or brain, contributor in large or small measure to the 
wellbeing and wealth of the State; and to another unintelligent, 
irresponsible, a lifelong charge on the State.46  
 
                                                        
45 Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1949: Appendix H: Memoranda submitted to the 
Committee 364 (Cmd. 8117) (quoted in BURTON PAULU, BRITISH BROADCASTING 18 (1956)). 
46 JOHN C.W. REITH, INTO THE WIND 170 (1949). 
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It is easy to see how Reith could be viewed as an elitist, but it is this approach 
that governed the BBC at least until the introduction of commercial television in 
Britain in 1955. Even after the emergence of competition and the Independent 
Television Authority, the BBC continued and continues to lead as one of the 
world’s foremost broadcasting institutions. 
While it is tempting to think of Reith’s approach as more noble than that 
of the American system, Burton Paulu suggests that it is important not to think of 
either system as superior:  
 
Both the critics and the admirers of the British system overlook one very 
important fact: a broadcasting system grows out of its environment and 
cannot be described or appraised apart from its national setting. Above 
all, it cannot be judged on the basis of how it might function in another 
country.47  
 
Paulu suggests that the British system is unfathomable to Americans because of 
the potential for government control. But this neglects the fact that government 
control was not a totally foreign concept in the United States; in fact, it had long 
been present in daily life in America in such forms as public schools, the Post 
Office and the military. Further, government control of radio actually was a 
                                                        
47 PAULU, supra note 45, at 3-4. 
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distinct possibility in the United States well into the 1920s.48 Paulu also points 
out that even without government control of broadcasting, critics warn of 
government influence in the American system just as much, if not more, than in 
the British system.49 
 James Curran and Jean Seaton suggest that the development of British 
broadcasting has been described in two ways.50 One view is that the emergence 
of the BBC monopoly was the “personal achievement” of John Reith, who 
embarked on a cultural mission and succeeded. The other view is that the 
emergence of the monopoly was accidental, or at least was a mere bureaucratic 
solution crafted by the Post Office to deal with what was viewed as a technical 
problem.51 R. H. Coase sides with the latter view, pointing out that radio was 
developed faster and with better results in the United States.52 More 
experimentation took place in the United States because people were eager to sell 
wireless receivers and set up commercial broadcasting services. The British Post 
Office, which already controlled all wireless and telephone communication, was 
not prepared to issue broadcasts and thus had no incentive to encourage 
                                                        
48 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 15-33. 
49 Id. at 42. 
50 JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: THE PRESS AND 
BROADCASTING IN BRITAIN 103 (5th ed. 1997). 
51 Id. 
52 R. H. COASE, BRITISH BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY (1950). 
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experiments.53 Furthermore, based on the U.S. experience, British officials 
thought a monopoly was necessary to avoid interference problems.54 Coase 
acknowledges that there was a unique public service mission in the United 
Kingdom but suggests that this is only part of the story. Paddy Scannell and 
David Cardiff suggest that there is truth in all of these understandings and that 
the public service mission came after the monopoly had been established for 
technical purposes.55 “Public service was a concept grafted onto an initial 
pragmatic set of arrangements between the Post Office and the British radio 
industry to establish a broadcasting service that would create a market for radio-
receiving apparatuses,”56 they write. 
Other countries were guided by the alternative approaches in the United 
States and Britain. Canada, for example, followed the United States at first, 
allowing private, commercial stations, but then created a national public 
broadcasting commission in 1932, which became the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation in 1936. Private stations remained, however, resulting in a hybrid 
model of public and private broadcasters.57   
                                                        
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23. 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 See PAUL W. NEWSBITT-LARKING, POLITICS, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA: CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 49-74 (2001). 
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In Britain, public service broadcasting had a solid footing, benefited from 
public support, and gained a complete monopoly over broadcasting from the 
1920s until the 1950s. The BBC retained a commitment to public service even 
after the introduction of commercial radio and television. Regulations made it 
difficult for commercial broadcasters to dominate the market and established 
standards requiring them to serve the public interest.58 “In short, commercial 
principles were kept on a short leash and were not permitted to set the rules for 
the entire system,”59 one scholar writes. 
The success of the BBC in preserving national traditions and culture also 
has invited harsh critiques from both the left and the right. Critics charge that 
despite efforts to insulate the BBC from political influence, the institution 
narrowly represents the interests of the dominant class. As one British scholar 
has noted, “In actual fact the largeness and wealth of the BBC indicate precisely 
its willingness to incline to the wishes of the powerful. If it posed the slightest 
threat to the powerful it would be dismantled.”60 It is worth noting that a similar 
                                                        
58 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 249 (1999). 
59 Id. 
60 William Maley, Centralisation and Censorship, in THE BBC AND PUBLIC SERVICE 
BROADCASTING 41 (Colin MacCabe & Olivia Stewart eds., 1986). 
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critique has been applied to American commercial media, in that news outlets 
can be said to reflect the ideology of their capitalist owners.61 
Scholars point out that, in Britain today, the long-established licensing fee 
and the culture it perpetuates are the central reasons for the BBC’s ability to 
produce what is often considered to be high-quality content.62 This paints a 
portrait of a quite different media culture for Britain compared to what 
originated in the United States and remains present today. 
 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT I:  
THE RISE OF THE MARKET ECONOMY AND STATE CAPITALISM 
 To understand the context in which broadcasting policy developed, it is 
important to consider the rise of market economies in the nineteenth century, 
which caused major transformations in society. The idea of the classic market 
economy, with free trade in land, labor and capital, never actually came to be, as 
described by Karl Polanyi, William M. Reddy and others.63 What did transpire, 
                                                        
61 See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (2002). 
62 See LUCY KUNG, INSIDE CNN AND THE BBC: MANAGING MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS 136 
(2000). 
63 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF 
OUR TIME (2nd. ed., 2001); WILLIAM M. REDDY, THE RISE OF MARKET CULTURE: THE TEXTILE TRADE 
AND FRENCH SOCIETY, 1750-1900 (1984). 
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as Reddy suggests, was the rise of a “market culture,” or a set of incorrect 
perceptions and misguided practices that were informed by the language and 
ideas of classic market economics but were never reflected in reality.64 Regardless 
of its level of adherence to the rules of capitalism, this market culture, in both the 
United States and Europe, “sparked countermovements of protest, reform, and 
public regulation, all attempting to control the unsettling effects of economic 
upheaval.”65 This was especially true in Britain, which has been called the first 
industrialized nation and the first to have an established working class, which 
emerged around the mid-eighteenth century.66 The British Empire was growing 
to cover a quarter of the planet, but the expectations for government were 
beginning to change to reflect needs beyond those of the national defense. The 
expansion of government was “attributable to the increasing demands and 
expectations of the newly enfranchised working population. Government began 
to conceive its duties as extending beyond those of maintaining law and order 
and of defending the realm.”67 These new measures enacted in the nineteenth 
century included efforts to improve working conditions and public health, and 
were “within the capabilities of the government to provide. They did not create 
                                                        
64 REDDY, supra note 63. 
65 STARR, supra note 1, at 233. 
66 See NORTON, supra note 22; THOMPSON, supra note 22. 
67 NORTON, supra note 22, at 52. 
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too great an economic burden; they were not themselves economic measures.”68 
Concern for public welfare began to grow in the mid-1800s and remained a 
largely nonpolitical issue well into the twentieth century.69 Protective measures 
were put into place by conservatives and liberals as the welfare state grew and 
the British Empire shrank. Attention was increasingly paid to domestic needs, 
especially during the interwar period. In this context, the British Parliament was 
designed to facilitate cooperation during the political process and to 
accommodate citizen input.70 
 This is also the context in which the paternalism of John Reith’s BBC likely 
grew. Since the Tudors and Stuarts, who heavily regulated what industry and 
commerce existed at the time,71 Britain has a long history of paternalism, the 
effects of which can be seen well into the 1800s. Historically, this notion of 
paternalism described the relationship of the aristocracy to the working class; it 
was thought that the privileged members of society owed some duty to the lower 
classes, which needed to be cared for both economically and culturally. This 
paternalism manifested itself, in part, in the protectionist measures instituted in 
                                                        
68 Id. 
69 See BRIAN HOWARD HARRISON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF BRITISH POLITICS, 1860-1995 
(1996). 
70 Id. at 55-84. 
71 See A.I. Ogus, Regulatory Law: Some Lessons from the Past, 12 LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1999) 
(quoted in MIKE FEINTUCK, “THE PUBLIC INTEREST” IN REGULATION 36 (2004)). 
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response to the Industrial Revolution. Polanyi’s “double movement” concept 
describes the way in which British society was pulled in separate directions, 
which he called expansionism and protectionism.72 As markets grew during the 
Industrial Revolution, government sought to facilitate economic growth but to 
keep the pace slow enough as to protect citizens from the negative effects of 
emerging markets. Self-interest was restrained to some degree in order to serve 
larger social aims. Philip Norton describes this pattern of British history:  
 
The reforms of the nineteenth century were facilitated not only by an 
empirical orientation to change but also by the paternalism of political 
leaders. Noblesse oblige (privilege entails responsibility) is a foreign phrase 
but it embodies a very British concept. Many of the country’s aristocratic 
leaders believed that they had a duty to help improve the condition of the 
working man.73 
 
This was far less so in America, where the revolutionary, republican spirit 
still filled society with a preference for individualism and independence over 
state intervention. As Michael Schudson notes, the increasing “democratization 
                                                        
72 POLANYI, supra note 63, at 136. 
73 NORTON, supra note 22, at 57. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
26 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
of economic life” stressed economic gain “to the exclusion of social aims.”74 This 
blurred distinctions of class in what Schudson calls “the egalitarian age,” a 
period in the 1830s and 1840s that saw “the opening of opportunity to persons 
regardless of birth or breeding.”75 The spread of public education during this 
time brought with it a spreading of wealth and political power, and “economic 
development was promoted and shared by many rather than by few.”76  Penny 
papers contributed to the expansion of the market through increased advertising 
thus enlarging the market for manufactured goods and by transforming the 
newspaper into a consumable product for private home use, not just borrowed or 
passed around in public.77 This all speaks to the rise of a market culture in the 
early United States that was somewhat closer to classic market ideal than the 
market culture in Europe. As Schudson writes, “It became more acceptable to 
think of ‘self-interest’ as the mainspring of human behavior and, indeed, in the 
theory of the market, as a motive to be admired, not distrusted.”78 Thus, it was 
during this period and the decades that followed that notions of democracy and 
personal freedom and equality became tied to economic self-interest. The 
                                                        
74 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS 46 (1978). 
75 Id. at 44. 
76 Id. at 45. 
77 Id. at 46. 
78 Id. at 58. 
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capitalist pursuit of wealth was becoming synonymous with democracy itself. 
The regulatory framework that made this shift possible has been described as 
capitalist state theory, in which a structural bias resulting from the state’s interest 
in economic growth leads to policies that prop up dominant capitalist actors.79 A 
history of paternalism and protectionism meant that Britain was more able to 
resist this approach, while the United States would embrace it. 
 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT II: THE PRESS AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
It was also in this context that the notion of press freedom formed in the 
American colonies; the main threat to free speech was thought to be from 
government, Paul Starr wrote:  
 
Precisely because of the interest in strengthening republican institutions, 
early American policy included strong positive commitments to 
information and communications, not merely the “negative liberty” of 
individual rights to free expression. While the Europeans taxed 
publications, the United States subsidized the growth of independent 
newspapers through cheap postal rates.80  
 
                                                        
79 See ROBERT B. HOROWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 41 (1989). 
80 STARR, supra note 1, at 16. 
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While the First Amendment expresses an essentially negative conception of 
liberty based on broad libertarian ideals,81 press freedom in practice relied on the 
positive commitments described by Starr. In the early- to mid-1800s, printers 
were typically aligned with political organizations, and the content of their 
publications was generally partisan and advocacy-oriented. This is not 
surprising, as funding came from political organizations, but it also came from 
government, which subsidized the early press through printing contracts and 
other means.82 
News began to see a shift in the mid-1800s as capitalism was born and the 
press began to commercialize.83 Gerald Baldasty documents the American 
“evolution of news as a commodity to be shaped and marketed with an eye for 
profit”84 as a phenomenon that began in the nineteenth century as newspapers 
shifted away from partisanship toward objectivity. While the partisan press was 
heavily influenced by political interests, it is important to note that its main goal 
was to provide information, advocate for causes, and support candidates for 
                                                        
81 See JEFFERY ALAN SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988). 
82 See RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE AND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION, 1700-1860S (1989); ROBERT MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN (2010).  
83 See GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY (1992). 
84 Id. at 4. 
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office.  Newspapers did not operate for profit, and they stressed news and 
politics over entertainment and gossip. Before the commercialization of news, 
partisan newspapers were part of the political process and produced a range of 
debate about contemporary issues. This began to change as publishers realized 
they could make a profit by neutralizing content, reaching wider audiences, and 
selling space to advertisers. It is in the period after the Civil War that advertising 
began to take its modern form, shifting from dry, fact-based claims to a reliance 
on slogans and images.85 
Thus, the rise of the penny press brought with it a decline in interest in 
and attention to politics and a rise in attention to business and the general 
commercialization of society. “The rise of the penny press, as limited 
geographically as those cheap and lively papers were, provided the basis for the 
press as a servant of business rather than of politics,”86 Baldasty wrote. Rather 
than advocating for political goals and participating in the political process, the 
press shifted its focus to providing entertaining and sensational fare that would 
attract large audiences, large circulations, and large revenues from advertisers. 
Success was measured by “news gathering and scoops, by ever-growing 
circulation, and by booming revenues. Public service was second to private 
                                                        
85 See INGER L. STOLE, ADVERTISING ON TRIAL: CONSUMER ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE 
PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE 1930S (2006). 
86 BALDASTY, supra note 83, at 37. 
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gain.”87 Advertisers began to counsel newspapers on the type of content that 
would be attractive to business. Successful papers would avoid politics, 
especially criticism of government officials, would be “optimistic and happy 
about the world” and “present the bright side of life,” and offer “something of 
interest to everyone in the potential reading audience, but particularly to 
women.”88 This shift also required increasing attention to demographics so that 
news content could be designed to attract consumers who could purchase the 
goods and services being advertised.89 
So while the rise of advertising during the nineteenth century helped free 
the commercial press from government and political parties, new structures and 
limitations were put in place. Rather than being tied to political ideologies, the 
press became tied to one dominant ideology of commercialism and market 
values. Schudson describes this as a shift to “the culture of a democratic market 
society, a culture which had no place for social or intellectual deference. This was 
the groundwork on which a belief in facts and a distrust of the reality, or 
objectivity, of ‘values’ could thrive.”90 The penny papers, from which modern 
journalistic values were drawn, were guided by and helped to institutionalize the 
emerging ideology of commercialism with its focus on economic growth. This 
                                                        
87 Id. at 47. 
88 Id. at 78. 
89 Id. at 114. 
90 SCHUDSON, supra note 74, at 60. 
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shift laid the groundwork for the commercialization of broadcasting in the 
coming century in the United States. In Britain, it is exactly this approach to 
media content that John Reith and the BBC would later resist, electing to ignore 
audience demands or at least balance them with content that reflected the high 
culture of the British elites.  
The commercialization of the American press in the mid-1800s would 
have parallels in Britain, where these new pressures “introduced a new system of 
press censorship more effective than anything that had gone before. Market 
forces succeeded where legal repression had failed in establishing the press as an 
instrument of social control.”91 The reaction was the emergence of a radical, 
working class press that would thrive in the 1800s and then decline with the 
increasing commercialization and industrialization of British life, the rise of the 
middle class, and the lifting of stamp and paper taxes, or the “taxes on 
knowledge.” The lifting of taxes was not meant as a gift to publishers or readers, 
but rather as a shift away from state regulation to regulation by market forces. 
“The parliamentary campaign for a free press was never inspired by a simple 
libertarian commitment to diversity of expression,” scholars wrote.  “All that had 
changed was an increasing conviction that market forces were a more efficient 
and morally preferable control system to that administered by the state.”92 In 
Britain as in America, the commercialization of the press helped to create mass 
                                                        
91 CURRAN & SEATON, supra note 50, at 17. 
92 Id. at 41-42. 
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audiences and mass markets, in which the press and advertising soon became 
dependent on each other.93 
Thus, the shifts in press structure in the United States and Britain in the 
nineteenth century show far more similarities than the structures chosen for any 
of the electronic communication technologies that emerged later. These early 
similarities emphasize the nature of broadcasting origins as a critical juncture, 
where links in the chains of communication history were clearly broken as the 
two countries diverged sharply from what had previously been similar social 
contexts. At the same time, these early similarities helped define the paths 
available to the actors who created broadcasting policy.  
 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT III: THE POST OFFICE AND THE TELEGRAPH 
 The revolution brought by the wired electric telegraph in the 1840s cannot 
be understated, as it separated communication from transportation for the first 
time in human history, as James Carey noted.94 The new communication 
technology quickly evolved in very different ways in the United States and 
Europe.95 As Paul Starr notes: 
                                                        
93 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 42. 
94 JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA AND SOCIETY (1989). 
95 STARR, supra note 1 at 153-155; RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING 
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2010). See also ROBERT L. THOMPSON, WIRING A CONTINENT: THE 
HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1832-1866 (1972);  Joshua D. Wolff, 
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In Europe, the domestic telegraph, and later the telephone, came under 
the control of the state and were often assimilated into the organization of 
the postal system. In the United States, in contrast, both the telegraph and 
the telephone were established as private enterprise and went through a 
phase of intense competition before evolving into monopolies and 
becoming subject to government regulation.96 
 
These early outcomes related to regulatory control constituted new and different 
understandings of the role of the state in regulating industry in general and 
communication in particular. In terms of path dependence, the contested policy 
decision in America created inertia and feedback through the removal of options 
over time. It also helped to write the scripts that future policymakers would rely 
on in promoting industry power over government control in communications. 
Had the United States opted for a government buyout of the telegraph 
companies as Britain did, American radio policy might have seen an entirely 
different fate. 
Thus, the birth of the telegraph represents a critical juncture of its own, 
and it initiated path-dependent processes that would carry well into the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“The Great Monopoly”: Western Union and the American Telegraph, 1845-1893 (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University 2008). 
96 STARR, supra note 1, at 153-155. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
34 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
twentieth century and affect the structure of broadcasting in both nations in the 
1920s and 1930s.97 But these processes were affected by more than mere matters 
of ownership and control. Broader economic, legal and cultural conditions 
affected the development of the new technology. The regulatory environment in 
the U.S. encouraged the development of industry and technology more than in 
Britain, as Starr notes: 
 
American law and policy, as well as other conditions, were more 
favorable to telecommunications development and led to more rapid, 
early deployment of the technologies. Indeed, Americans played more of a 
pioneering role in developing both the telegraph and the telephone than 
one might reasonably have expected from the country’s overall level of 
industrial and scientific development in the mid-nineteenth century.98 
 
The centralized nature of the economy in the early American republic, which 
presupposed a government takeover of the telegraph, eventually came into 
conflict with a “state-oriented political economy that encouraged competition 
between rival telegraph network providers chartered as private corporations.”99 
In spite of this competition in the race to develop the first telecommunications 
                                                        
97 Id. at 189. 
98 Id. at 154. 
99 JOHN, supra note 95, at 8.  
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network, Western Union gained control of the telegraph industry in the 1840s, 
and the Associated Press dominated wire service news. These monopolies 
represented “a new form of centralized power” for which Americans “at first 
had no institutional response.”100 Western Union was subject to more 
government regulation than other business operations,101 but it still gave 
preference to business correspondence over personal messages, and its collusion 
with the Associated Press made it difficult for smaller, local wire services to exist. 
This provided a sharp contrast to the telegraph service that was provided by the 
British Post Office, which treated the technology as a public utility and a 
nationalized monopoly. It was not until the late nineteenth century in America 
that concerns about private monopoly power grew and regulation of industry 
became acceptable. This would be evident with the trust-busting of presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) and William Howard Taft (1909-1913).  
This is not to suggest that Americans did not debate the private monopoly 
held by Western Union in the nineteenth century. Wolff characterizes the rise of 
Western Union as America’s first national corporate monopoly as a “traumatic 
transition” from the tradition of public ownership in the postal system.102 This 
took place in spite of intense public, state and commercial opposition, and 
                                                        
100 STARR, supra note 1, at 16. 
101 CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 18 (2000). 
102 WOLFF, supra note 95. 
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represented a shift away from traditional concerns for the public interest. As 
early as 1845, The New York Herald had called for the federal government to 
“undertake the arrangement,” suggesting that the “public interest” would be 
“much more securely promoted” in the hands of government.103 Similarly, an 
1868 article in The New York Times summarized a report advocating for uniting 
the post office and the telegraph in the United States, as had been done in Britain 
and much of Europe. The report by Massachusetts lawyer Gardiner G. Hubbard 
described the situation in Europe and “gives evidence of the fact that where the 
Government owns the telegraph and unites it with the Post Office the wants of 
the public are far better supplied than where the lines are owned and operated 
by individuals or companies.”104  
By the 1880s, many Americans were hopeful for a government takeover of 
the telegraph. As John notes, “In no other decade did so many journalists, 
lawmakers, and telegraph users invest such high hopes in the establishment of a 
government telegraph. And in no other decade did they come away more 
disappointed.”105 The closest Congress came was with the Post Road and 
Telegraph Act of 1866,106 which was designed to restrict Western Union and 
made provisions for a possible Congressional buyout of existing telegraph 
                                                        
103 Electric Telegraph, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 22, 1845 (quoted in JOHN, supra note 95, at 55). 
104 The Post Office and the Telegraph, New York Times, Nov. 25, 1868. 
105 JOHN, supra note 95, at 172. 
106 Post Road and Telegraph Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 221, c. 230. 
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corporations. The passage of the act and the nearly simultaneous nationalization 
of the British telegraph spurred many calls for a government takeover in the 
United States, such as one by Missouri Senator B. Gratz Brown. Contending that 
competition was not working in the telegraph industry, Brown proposed that a 
government telegraph would, like the postal service, better serve rural areas and 
would break up the “collusive relationship” between the telegraph corporations 
and the Associated Press.107 This takeover never happened, and political 
economists in the late 1800s introduced the idea that the telegraph represented a 
“natural monopoly,” an idea that could be used to justify private ownership by a 
single company, but could also be used as a call for more effective federal 
government control.108 This sort of debate foreshadows what was about to 
become the central question surrounding the emergence of broadcasting.  
 The American tolerance of the Western Union monopoly contrasts sharply 
with the British approach to the telegraph. While the British state eventually 
relinquished direct control of the publishing industry, new communication 
technologies did not share the same fate. The rise of the telegraph in the mid-
1800s led to the Telegraph Act of 1869,109 which gave the Post Office the 
                                                        
107 JOHN, supra note 95, at 121. 
108 JOHN, supra note 95, at 157. 
109 Telegraph Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 73. 
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exclusive right to transmit telegrams within the United Kingdom.110 Prior to the 
act, several private telegraph companies operated in the United Kingdom, 
including the Electric and International, the British and Irish Magnetic, and the 
United Kingdom Telegraphy Company. Fixed prices were set in 1865, several 
years before the transition to full public monopoly. (This transition from 
regulation of private industry to total public ownership would later be mirrored 
in the shift from the British Broadcasting Company to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation in the 1920s.) In addition to inconsistent pricing, the public had also 
complained about poor service, especially in rural areas. These complaints from 
the public fueled the drive for nationalization in the public interest.111 
Despite the complaints, even before the postmaster general was 
empowered by Parliament to purchase the private holdings, the telegraph 
service was a popular means of communication among ordinary citizens, as 
compared to America’s Western Union, which mostly existed to serve business 
communication needs. In 1868, the average Western Union toll was $1.05, about 
two-thirds of what an American worker earned in a day.112 By 1870, the British 
and American services each sent about ten million messages per year, but the 
United States had twice the population of Britain. The British service transmitted 
                                                        
110 See ANDREW CRISELL, AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY OF BRITISH BROADCASTING (2002); 
JOSEPH C. HEMMEON, THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH POST OFFICE (1912).  
111 CRISELL, supra note 110. 
112 See WOLFF, supra note 95, at 9. 
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thirty-three million messages in 1884-85 and fifty million messages in 1886-
1887.113  Commercial and speculative messages provided 87% of the Western 
Union’s revenue in 1887, according to a report from Western Union to the U.S. 
Postmaster General. The report said only 2% of Americans used the telegraph 
each year, and only 5% of the company’s revenue came from “family and social 
messages.”114 According to Wolff, “To Western Union, the telegraph was first 
and foremost an adjunct of commerce, and speed was more important than price. 
As long as the principal customers of the telegraph were in businesses that 
demanded high-volume, high-speed communication, Western Union’s network 
was ‘best.’”115 This characterizes the opposite of what was expected from public 
service utilities operating in the public interest. Reformers who opposed the 
Western Union monopoly “envisioned a low-priced telegraph that would be 
used by all Americans, and while many reformers claimed that such a system 
would be at least break-even, some admitted that even at a loss it was a cost 
worth bearing.”116  
The British telegraph in the hands of the post office was never profitable, 
partly due to management problems and partly due to competition from 
                                                        
113 See HEMMEON, supra note 110, at 210. 
114 See WOLFF, supra note 95, at 4. 
115 Id. at 8. 
116 Id. 
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telephone and improved postal services.117 So neither the British nor the 
American telegraph services were successful in the sense that neither was able to 
serve a broad citizenry and remain profitable. But it certainly is clear where their 
priorities lay. The American system served American business at a high cost and 
a large profit; the British system served the public at a low cost even while 
operating at a loss. And despite their shortcomings, both of these distinct 
approaches to regulating communication technology would be repeated to some 
degree by each respective country, first with the telephone and later with 
broadcasting. 
Especially in Britain, the early decision to maintain government control 
over wired transmissions had a lasting effect. An 1880 court case established the 
post office as the universal licenser of wired phone services,118 and a 1904 act 
gave the Postmaster General control of wireless telegraphy and later all 
telephony.119 Ultimately the post office became the licenser of “broadcast 
wireless telephony” and the sole operator of broadcasting, as it began to compete 
with its own licensees and established a near monopoly by taking over trunk 
lines and refusing to extend local licenses until after 1911. Telephony remained a 
public monopoly under the post office until 1984 when it was privatized as 
                                                        
117 HEMMEON, supra note 110, at 218. 
118 A. N. HOLCOMBE, The Telephone in Great Britain, 21 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
96, 99 (1907). 
119 CRISELL, supra note 110, at 12; STARR, supra note 1, at 340. 
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British Telecom. The United States, on the other hand, would allow its telephone 
service to operate as a private, regulated near-monopoly, and would leave 
broadcasting in the hands of industry, which by the turn of the century, was a 
whole new force in society.120 
In sum, Britain and the United States experienced relatively similar 
processes of commercialization in their press structures in the nineteenth 
century, setting the stage for divergent approaches to broadcasting. But the 
divergent approaches are less surprising considering the path-dependent 
processes initiated during the emergence of the first electronic communication 
forms in the mid-1800s. Britain viewed competition in the telegraph industry as 
problematic and chose to nationalize and improve the service, which was 
popular among the public even before the government buyout of industry. 
Despite widespread protests, the United States tolerated the Western Union 
monopoly, preferring a veneer of regulatory control to any sort of government 
takeover. In both countries, the debates over the regulation of telegraphy would 
be echoed in the debates over broadcasting, as similar policy scripts would be 
invoked by subsequent historical actors. The policy outcomes would also be 
echoed, suggesting that causal chains were being laid even if the links would 
later be broken, if only for a short time. And although the public interest may not 
have been explicitly invoked in communication policymaking at this critical 
                                                        
120 See ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC 
RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS (1998); STOLE, supra note 85. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
42 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
juncture, the different approaches to the telegraph likely influenced what 
different meanings the public interest would take on when it was invoked later. 
 
THE RADIO EXPLOSION IN AMERICA 
At the start of the 1920s, the conditions of radio in the U.S. and Britain 
were not so different. In the United States, the Navy was poised to retain control 
over coastal operations following World War I, and the Department of 
Commerce would issue licenses to amateurs and the handful of private stations 
that requested them.121 In Britain, the post office retained control of the airwaves 
and licensed a handful of radio manufacturers to make their own broadcasts.122 
Demand was low, broadcast signals could not travel far, and the situation was 
relatively stable. But advances in technology and in imagination had given birth 
to the possibility of broadcasting as a form of mass communication, and radio 
manufacturers were eager to see their new crystal set receivers in every 
household. Stimulating this sort of mass demand required programming, and as 
radio grew, there was no shortage of groups of people — from newspapers, 
department stores and other businesses to universities, churches and political 
groups — who wanted to make their voices heard.123 Spectrum scarcity — the 
limited physical property of the airwaves — demanded some system of control, 
                                                        
121 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 15-33. 
122 CRISELL, supra note 110, at 13. 
123 BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 4. 
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but the sudden boundless enthusiasm to hear and be heard challenged efforts to 
regulate the new technology. 
The wartime ban on amateurs receiving wireless signals was finally lifted 
by the Navy on April 12, 1919, and the ban on transmitting was lifted September 
26.124 The Department of Commerce licensed thousands of amateur operators in 
1920 and 1921, but the amateurs, despite their advanced knowledge, were slow 
to gain access to the new technologies that would allow them to send and receive 
speech and music. They were also relegated to the amateur range of frequencies 
so as not to interfere with the growing number of private businesses operating 
their own licensed stations, such as department stores and newspapers. It is 
tempting to describe these stations as “commercial,” and they were in the sense 
that they were operated by private businesses, but there was no paid advertising 
on the airwaves at this point. Rather, for a station run by a department store or 
newspaper, for example, “the entire station was an advertisement.”125 “Toll” 
advertiser-supported broadcasting, or “commercial” broadcasting in the modern 
sense, would not come along until 1922, and it would be slow to catch on. 
Nevertheless, as the struggle for the airwaves continued, the amateurs did not 
always comply with warnings from the Department of Commerce to stay in their 
range. But once the amateurs were back in the radio game, Westinghouse 
                                                        
124 This story is told in BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 39-74; DOUGLAS, supra note 29, at 292-
315; ROSEN, supra note 28, at 15-33. 
125 STARR, supra note 1, at 336. 
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executives realized what they were missing out on. They had failed to 
understand the true potential and meaning of radio. Westinghouse scrambled to 
build a new transmitter at its plant in Pittsburgh and applying to the Department 
of Commerce for a special license to launch a regular broadcasting service with 
the goal of stimulating sales of receivers. The company received the call letters 
KDKA, and on November 2, 1920, made what is usually considered the first 
mass radio broadcast of significant strength as they read election returns over the 
air.126 
Over the next year, amateur operators started lining up to purchase the 
radio sets made by hobbyists and sold by department stores, some of which 
started their own radio departments. In 1921, Westinghouse aligned with 
General Electric, RCA and AT&T to share a pool of patents and trademarks and 
began manufacturing radio sets.127 GE and Westinghouse manufactured radio 
sets and parts while RCA marketed and sold them, and AT&T handled 
transmitter equipment. Towers went up all over the country; amateurs did 
whatever they could to circumvent the four radio giants. These four companies 
formed the radio trust that would come to dominate what can only be loosely 
described as an “industry” over the next few years and receive licenses for the 
preferred high-power bands of the spectrum. Despite the growth of the radio 
trust, “the industry” was still a diverse mix of interests, including everyone from 
                                                        
126 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 7. 
127 BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 61-74. 
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RCA to universities to churches to political groups. Amateurs and others also 
inundated the Department of Commerce for private business licenses to 
broadcast on the better, clearer frequencies. And although Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover had been granted the power to issue these licenses 
under the 1912 Radio Act,128 he had no power to deny them. Under these 
conditions, chaos was inevitable. Broadcasting presented a unique challenge in 
America, in that it “did not lend itself to any of the older forms of government 
supervision. . . . Regulation and standardization therefore were necessary but 
impossible within the framework of existing institutions.”129 
The battle for control raged. In January 1922, the Department of 
Commerce ordered all amateurs to stop broadcasting to attempt to bring order to 
the airwaves.130 Meanwhile, the post office continued to fight, introducing 
resolutions in Congress in 1922 and 1923.131 House Resolution 14196, for 
example, sought “to launch a legislative program projecting an ultimate 
monopoly of electrical means of transmission under postal auspices,” but “the 
measure had little support.”132 Hoover, in 1921, had established the 
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Government Broadcasting, including 
                                                        
128 Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. 62-264 (1912). 
129 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 4-5. 
130 Id. at 37. 
131 Id. at 45-46. 
132 Id. at 46. 
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representatives from ten government departments and agencies. He was hoping 
to gain a mandate for control of radio in the Department of Commerce and to stir 
up business sentiment against the Navy, which was still reaching for broad 
control of radio and interfering with business operations. The Navy launched a 
publicity campaign in 1922 to promote its own cause, and the post office 
continued to claim “all rights for the transmission of government materials,” a 
position that “effectively isolated the postal service from the navy and the 
Commerce Department and drastically curtailed any effect it might have on the 
committee.”133  
In January 1923, the interdepartmental committee was renamed the 
Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, or IRAC, which recommended a 
regulated private system that would be available to the government in the event 
of war.134 The growing institutionalization of corporate control prompted RCA 
President James G. Harbord to declare by the end of 1923 that “the ‘heresy of 
government ownership, especially in radio matters,’ no longer persisted in the 
federal bureaucracy.”135 Rosen compares the radio trust broadcasting alliance to 
                                                        
133 Id. at 43. 
134 Id. at 45.  See also Louise M. Benjamin, Regulating the Government’s Airwaves: Creation of 
the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), 51 J. OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA 489 (2007). 
135 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 46. 
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railroad pools that would fix prices and divide profits.136 They didn’t fix prices, 
but the radio trust essentially colluded with Commerce to protect and preserve 
the system that would best serve its members interests. Despite the introduction 
of numerous bills and resolutions in Congress, policymaking was delayed as 
radio continued to grow and change.137  
The search for money — how to profit not just off the sale of radio sets but 
off broadcasting itself — led to ideas and experimentation. Broadcasting was 
mostly local and the work of amateurs. As AT&T experimented with new 
strategies to dominate radio, it shifted attention away from selling transmitters 
and began constructing commercial facilities designed to transmit paid 
messages. By 1922, AT&T received a license to operate its own station, WEAF in 
New York City, as a facility available for hire; with this, advertising-supported 
“toll broadcasting” was born.138 David Sarnoff, then vice president of RCA, took 
the next step toward modern forms when he proposed in 1922 “the 
establishment of a high-quality, nationwide broadcasting organization to be 
called the ‘Public Service Broadcasting Company or National Radio Broadcasting 
Company or American Radio Broadcasting Company, or some similar name’.”139 
Sarnoff suggested that the company would include in addition to business men 
                                                        
136 Id. at 48. 
137 Id. at 47-59. 
138 Id. at 65. 
139 STARR, supra note 1, at 336. 
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“a few men from outside, prominent in national or civic affairs.”140 Sarnoff even 
proposed a system of licensing based on private radio sales, not through 
government, as would happen in Britain with the creation of the British 
Broadcasting Company around the same time, in 1922.  
Meanwhile, Hoover proceeded to grant licenses and organize some 
broadcasters on specific bandwidths, shifting stations operated by private 
businesses into the government band of the spectrum even though he had no 
legal authority to do so.141 By 1924, however, “[T]he industry began to establish 
its own priorities separate and distinct from the Commerce Department and 
began to support an alternative approach to control under an administrative 
official.”142 The “industry,” at this point, rather than being a cohesive set of 
commercial interests as the term implies, was still a diverse mix of private 
broadcasters, ranging from the four radio giants to department stores and 
newspapers to universities and churches, all competing for limited spectrum and 
growing weary of Hoover’s messy, extralegal approach. Nevertheless, the vision 
of control of radio by an administrative official would ultimately anticipate the 
regulatory commissions of the New Deal and the creation of the Federal Radio 
Commission in 1927.  
                                                        
140 Letter to E.W. Rice, 17 June 1922 (quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 59). 
141 STARR, supra note 1, at 335. 
142 ROSEN, supra note 28, at 76. 
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Broadcasters eventually favored regulation because stations were plagued 
by interference due to a lack of control.143 As Hoover famously commented, “I 
think this is probably the only industry of the United States that is unanimously 
in favor of having itself regulated.”144 The dominant commercial players in the 
industry, of course, wanted to be regulated in a very specific way that would 
allow them to control the prime real estate in the radio spectrum. 
By 1923, with so many groups and individuals competing for the 
airwaves, Hoover declared the spectrum “closed” and refused to issue any new 
licenses, which led to a federal appeals court ruling that said Commerce could 
not deny licenses but could assign frequencies.145 Effectively, the Department of 
Commerce could do little more than register broadcasters and call for self-
regulation. Meanwhile, the department worked to craft legislation that would 
give the department the power it needed to accomplish its goals, and many of 
these early attempts at legislation invoked the public interest and public service. 
For example, the commerce department helped to design House bill 11964, “To 
amend the Radio Act of 1912,” which was discussed before the House 
                                                        
143 Herman S. Hettinger & William A. Porter, Radio Regulation: A Case Study in Basic Policy 
Conflicts, 221 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 122 (1942). 
144 SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 146 
(3rd. ed. 1976). 
145 Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., Inc., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries in early 1923.146 The bill that 
would become the 1927 Radio Act was starting to take shape, but at this point the 
regulatory power was still vested in the Commerce Department rather than an 
independent commission. The proposed bill gave Commerce power to grant 
licenses and stated that a license could be revoked “whenever the Secretary of 
Commerce shall deem such revocation to be in the public interest.”147  
Hiram Percy Maxim, representing the American Radio Relay League, an 
association of amateur operators, was among the witnesses who testified before 
the committee.148 Maxim was not opposed to the idea of vesting licensing power 
in the Department of Commerce — indeed, nearly everyone accepted that some 
system of licensing was unavoidable — but Maxim was concerned that the bill 
made it too easy to push amateurs aside. He contested some language in the 
proposed bill, fearing that “public service” could provide a rationale for 
withholding a license from an amateur. Maxim said: “This is not fair or just to 
the amateurs of the country, and we hope nothing ulterior is intended in this 
peculiar wording.”149  
                                                        
146 To Amend the Radio Act of 1912: Hearings Before the Committee on the Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, 67th Congress, 4th Session (1923). 
147 Id. at 2. 
148 Id. (statement of Hiram Percy Maxim, the American Radio Relay League). 
149 Id. at 15 (statement of Hiram Percy Maxim). 
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Representative Wallace H. White of Maine responded, using “public 
interest” interchangeably with “public service.” He said he beleived the bill 
aimed to convey the notion that “the work of the amateur by and large was in 
the public interest, certainly it was not intended to exclude him.”150 In theory, 
amateur operators would be protected by the public interest, but the vagueness 
of the term raised questions. White even reflected on the problematic nature of 
the “public service” language, as possibly offering too much protection in legal 
terms:  
 
I was a little fearful myself of that language, ‘general public service.’ 
Those of us who are lawyers realize that when we speak of a public 
service corporation we speak of a distinctive class of corporate form. It is 
not intended to narrow it to a public utility, and I think, perhaps, the 
language might be improved.151  
 
White also wrote that the “whole theory followed in drafting the bill was to get 
away from specific statutory limitations” on the grounds that “a statutory 
provision might be obsolete tomorrow.”152 The tendency among regulators was 
to do as little regulating as possible, and this was for two interconnected reasons. 
                                                        
150 Id. at 16 (statement of Wallace H. White). 
151 Id. at 17 (statement of Wallace H. White). 
152 Id. at 58 (statement of Wallace H. White). 
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First, policymakers generally had weak understandings of the new technology, 
especially as it was constantly undergoing change and innovation. Second, they 
did not want to produce legislation that would be accused of limiting or stifling 
this innovation. 
The proposed legislation reflected this hesitancy. One engineer objected to 
provisions in the bill “to amend the Radio Act of 1912” that “would give the 
power to the Secretary of Commerce to exclude, from the requirements of the 
regulations hereby prescribed or authorized, any radio station and the operators 
required therein…in which he shall find that such action will facilitate commerce 
and will not be incompatible with the public interest.”153 This sort of vague 
provision gave Hoover and the commerce department the power to do what they 
wanted “in the public interest.” The committee’s chairman, William S. Greene, 
replied plainly: “That is what we are going to try to do, of course. We have been 
at this business for a number of years and we have been trying to liberalize it and 
not to hamper it.”154  
Not surprisingly, the RCA favored the bill, saying in a letter to the 
committee:  
 
The Radio Corporation [of America] is of the opinion that the purposes of 
the bill are in the interests of the American public to adequately provide 
                                                        
153 Id. at 58 (statement of Alfred P. Thom). 
154 Id.  
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for regulations which will foster rather than hinder the scientific 
development of the art, and because it provides what radio needs, a 
flexible, mobile regulating power.155  
 
RCA proposed adding language that would give preference to the dominant 
broadcasters in matters regarding licensing. The RCA letter, signed by William 
Brown, RCA’s vice president and general attorney, proposed that “the Secretary 
of Commerce shall take into due consideration the existence and location of 
existing stations, the property interests, investments, and any equities involved 
therein, as well as the special adaptability, if any, of the apparatus therein located 
for use in specific bands of wave lengths.”156 RCA also wanted the bill to protect 
the property rights of established broadcasters, namely RCA. It proposed 
language saying, “the Secretary of Commerce may in the public interest or for 
protection of private property rights prevent the erection and operation of any 
station hereunder in a location where the operation thereof would materially 
interfere with the operation of, or property rights in, an existing radio station.”157 
This idea that the public interest should be associated with efficient station 
operation unencumbered by interference would become central to the Federal 
                                                        
155 Id. at 59 (letter from William Brown). 
156 Id. at 60 (letter from William Brown). 
157 Id. at 61 (letter from William Brown). 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
54 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
Radio Commission’s approach to licensing after 1927. RCA was helping to write 
the script that policymakers would come to rely on. 
Even Hoover, when speaking before congressional committees, frequently 
invoked the public interest regarding regulation, but usually in vague ways or 
simply to refer to the idea that the public had become interested in radio.158 In 
this sense, the public interest was simply what interested the public. For 
example, he told the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
that the high number of receiving stations meant that “the matter has become 
one of profound public interest.”159 
Despite vague or unclear meanings, the public interest language was 
beginning to appear consistently in any legislation related to radio and in the 
related congressional hearings. In fact, as early as 1924, House bill 7357, “A Bill to 
Regulate Radio Communications, and for Other Purposes,” which also vested 
regulatory power in the Department of Commerce, included the “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity” language that would appear in the 1927 
Act.160 In his testimony related to this bill, Hoover helped give shape to the 
public interest language by using it to celebrate the idea that radio had been a 
success in the United States because it was not subject to over-regulation, but he 
                                                        
158 Id. at 29 (statement of Herbert Hoover). 
159 Id. 
160 To Regulate Radio Communication: Hearings Before the Committee on the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 68th Congress, 1st Session (1924). 
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also noted proposed that radio was not merely a business or meant for private 
gain. Rather, “[I]t is a public concern impressed with the public trust and to be 
considered primarily from the standpoint of public interest to the same extent 
and upon the basis of the same general principles as our other public utilities.”161  
While Hoover continued to conflate “public interest” and “public 
utilities,” something the lawyers involved were increasingly careful to avoid, he 
was mainly using the general appeal to the public good to advocate for minimal 
regulation. At the same time, Hoover also responded to requests by the Navy to 
lengthen the period for which licenses would be granted. Hoover defended the 
need for short licensing periods, which would retain power in his hands to make 
adjustments as technological conditions continued to change. He told the 
committee that the question of license duration “would go to the heart of the 
whole question of the public interest in radio” and that “the use of wave lengths 
in the ether was a public function, a matter of public interest, and should be 
retained by the Government on behalf of the public.162 Again, the appeal to the 
public good and public interest was a way to justify power and control in his 
hands.  
Hoover put up such a fight for control of radio, it was almost tragic that 
the regulatory framework he was fighting so hard for would eventually be given 
by Congress not to him but to an independent commission. Although 
                                                        
161 Id. at 10 (statement of Herbert Hoover). 
162 Id. at 27 (statement of Herbert Hoover). 
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government policy in the 1920s, haphazard as it was, clearly favored 
corporations and the military, by this time, the popular conception of the 
airwaves and how they would be used was well established: “Whether saving 
lives at sea or bringing lectures to the farmer, radio was consistently cast as the 
agent of American democracy and altruism.”163 Susan Douglas suggests that the 
airwaves needed an altruistic caretaker, and the corporate radio broadcasters 
worked to position themselves for this role so as to minimize government 
interference. Douglas wrote: 
 
The badge of legitimacy went to the communications corporations, who 
burnished its authority by presenting themselves as acting out of 
benevolent, farsighted paternalism. There were dissenters from this 
conception of spectrum management, especially among amateurs, 
educators, and religious groups, and there was some resentment in the 
1920s about a potential corporate monopoly of the air. But there was no 
major break in this ideological frame concerning who was best qualified to 
serve as warden of the ether.164 
 
This corporate paternalism would find parallels in British radio, for the BBC has 
been described as acting out of the same sort of cultural concern, which will be 
                                                        
163 DOUGLAS, supra note 29, at 320. 
164 Id. at 317. 
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discussed later. What is striking is that even though American paternalism could 
be seen in the dominant communication corporations and British paternalism 
came from a government monopoly, both sets of institutions had a similar 
approach to their social and cultural role in the mid-1920s. Once again, the 
similarities between the two countries suggest that although causal chains were 
being laid, they would have to be broken at some point in order to produce 
divergent outcomes. Douglas ends her story of American radio in 1922, 
suggesting that the links in the chain of U.S. radio policy were established and 
unbreakable. But further investigation challenges this notion. Until the passage 
of the Radio Act of 1927, the commercial structure of radio was hardly a foregone 
conclusion, and even after 1927, it could hardly be considered stable. Thus, 
throughout the 1920s, policymakers and a diverse group of public and private 
interests continued to fight for control of broken chains, as exemplified by 
Hoover and his series of radio conferences. 
 
HERBERT HOOVER AND THE NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCES 
 The system of broadcast regulation that would emerge from the chaos of 
the early- and mid-1920s “has been much criticized as a confused jumble of 
laissez-faire and statist principles.”165 This was the result of efforts by the 
government and industry to find a solution to a clear instance of market failure, 
                                                        
165 Thomas Streeter, Beyond Freedom of Speech and the Public Interest: The Relevance of Critical 
Legal Studies to Communications Policy, 40 J. OF COMM. 43, 56 (1990). 
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and it was the broad goal Secretary Hoover set out to achieve in the 1920s when 
he called a series of National Radio Conferences, one each year from 1922 
through 1925. More specifically, William Rowland describes the conferences as 
“the principal federal government efforts reviewing the options for radio 
regulation in the mid-1920s,” and suggests that, “while adopting a public interest 
gloss,” the conferences “were envisioning its application in the context of the 
well rehearsed cooperation between the government and the private 
communications industries over the preceding two decades.”166 Rowland 
concludes that the conferences ensured that the government would implement 
little direct regulation, the idea of public service would mean technological 
capability, and that license holders would be subject to no specific 
responsibilities or requirements.167 
Hoover preferred a system of “regulated individualism,”168 which was on 
full display during the four National Radio Conferences in the 1920s. In his 
memoirs, he conveyed the struggle he faced with limited regulatory power and 
legal authority even as he worked to move the progress of radio forward and 
control the increasingly chaotic airwaves. This was to be done “in our usual 
                                                        
166 Willard D. Rowland Jr., The Meaning of “The Public Interest” in Communications Policy, 
Part II: Its Implementation in Early Broadcast Law and Regulation, 2 COMM. L. & POL’Y 363, 375 (1997). 
167 Id. 
168 HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 300-01 (1952). 
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fashion of solving problems wherever possible by cooperation rather than by 
law.”169 That the titans of industry desired a monopoly of the airwaves — a 
property of “enormous financial value”170 — apparently was not lost on Hoover. 
He was also eager to cooperate with them, in his “usual fashion,” devising 
systems of self-regulation rather than making laws.171 He also saw the enormous 
potential for radio to reach into every American home and provide great benefit 
to the public, not just as consumers but also as citizens.  
The First National Radio Conference convened in Washington in 1922 
with more than 1,000 delegates in attendance. The delegates came from a range 
of government departments, industry, utilities, institutes and universities. In his 
opening address, Hoover stated:  
 
We are indeed today upon the threshold of a new means of widespread 
communication of intelligence that has the most profound importance 
from the point of view of public education and public welfare. The 
comparative cheapness…of receiving sets…bids fair to make them almost 
universal in the American home.172 
  
                                                        
169 Id. at 140. 
170 Id. at 139. 
171 Id. at 140. 
172 Id. at 140. 
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Even in this first conference, Hoover invoked the notion of the public 
interest, but did so in the context of “central stations” and the “communication of 
commercial matters,” referring to the increasingly dominant private broadcasters 
who ran stations for the purpose of publicizing their businesses.173 His opening 
statement expressed the central dilemma at the time:  Who is in charge of the 
airwaves? Again he invoked the public interest and, in expressing his views on 
advertising, made one of his most famous, oft-quoted statements: “[I]t becomes 
of primary public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under what 
circumstances, and with what type of material. It is inconceivable that we should 
allow so great a possibility for service to be drowned in advertising chatter.”174 
Hoover also described to his audience the dilemma of how to finance 
broadcasting stations, which was a relatively new concern, shifting the focus 
away from the sale of receiving sets. In two sentences, Hoover described and 
rejected the general European model: “In certain countries, the government has 
prohibited the use of receiving instruments except upon payment of a fee, out of 
which are supported government-sending stations. I believe that such a plan 
would most seriously limit the development of the art and its social 
possibilities.”175 The only alternative was a system of regulation required a 
“policeman” and the establishment of “public right over the ether roads.” The 
                                                        
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 141. 
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“policeman” would be responsible for detecting the “ether hogs that are 
endangering the traffic.”176 Hoover concluded: “There must be no national regret 
that we have parted with a great national asset.”177 
 The outcome of this first national conference made clear reference to radio 
as a public utility to be operated in the public interest. Following the conference, 
the Commerce Department prepared a report that concluded: “That it is the 
sense of the conference that radio communication is a public utility and as such 
should be regulated and controlled by the Federal Government in the public 
interest.”178 The report would also lay out definitions for different types of 
broadcasting, including government, public, private and toll. Public broadcasting 
was defined as “signifying broadcasting by public institutions, including State 
governments political subdivisions thereof, and universities and such others as 
may be licensed for the purpose of disseminating informational and educational 
service.” Toll broadcasting was defined as “signifying broadcasting where 
charge is made for the use of the transmitting station.”179 That these early 
distinctions were made in 1922 suggests that much remained to be determined 
about the organization of the airwaves. The report also laid out considerations to 
                                                        
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
178 Report of the Department of Commerce Conference on Radio Telephony in To Amend 
the Radio Act of 1912, supra note 146, at 32.  
179 Id. at 33. 
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be followed in the granting of licenses and offered preference to stations with 
high degrees of public interest: “It is recommended that the degree of public 
interest attaching to a private or toll broadcasting service be considered in 
determining its priority in the granting of licenses, in the assignment of wave 
frequencies, and in the assignment of permissible power and operating time, 
within the general regulations for these classes of service.”180 In this invocation, 
the idea of “general interest” stations begins to receive priority over propaganda 
or special interest stations, which would include churches and political groups. 
 Three more “conferences of the industry”181 were held in Washington, the 
second in March 1923 and the third in October 1924. In these early years, Hoover 
“felt we should have more experience before drafting legislation. With the 
approval of the Congressional committees we carried on until 1924.” Congress 
was not ready to take on such a complicated topic and did not see any great 
urgency to deal with radio. “One of our troubles in getting legislation was the 
very success of the voluntary system we had created. Members of the 
Congressional committees kept saying, ‘It is working well, so why bother?’ A 
long period of delay ensued.”182 
 In his opening statement at the third radio conference in 1924, Hoover 
expressed his continued hope for the future of radio. Even as the broadcasting 
                                                        
180 Id. at 36. 
181 HOOVER, supra note 168, at 141. 
182 Id. at 142. 
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industry began to take shape, Hoover again equated the technology to a public 
utility and expressed concern for its impact on “family life.”183 He concluded by 
again invoking the public interest. Despite his grand rhetoric, his contextual 
language at this point does not necessarily suggest an understanding of the 
concept as a code word for pro-industry regulation as Rowland and others have 
suggested. He speaks of the position of elites with a self-imposed “high sense of 
service” in the public interest, and he again invokes parallels with public 
utilities.184  
In one sense, he is advocating self-regulation by broadcasters in order to 
avoid legislation that might have limited their power. But in doing so, he is 
highlighting a moralistic concern that would have lasting effects. When the 
Federal Radio Commission was created in 1927, broadcasters were not sure how 
the new commission would treat the industry, and, for some time, broadcasters 
considered themselves guests in the home, making efforts to limit the extent to 
which they exploited their power for commercial aims.185 Perhaps this was an 
early attempt to introduce the idea of social responsibility, in that he suggested 
                                                        
183 Recommendations for Regulation of Radio Adopted by the Third National Radio Conference, 
Oct. 6-10, 1924, (1924). Hoover’s address is printed in Section 1.  
184 Id. 
185 STARR, supra note 1, at 341.  See also JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, SAME TIME, SAME STATION: 
CREATING AMERICAN TELEVISION, 1948-1961, 25 (2007).   
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broadcasters should avoid direct advertising and provide important social and 
political content.  
 At the fourth conference in November 1925, Hoover was still advocating 
and celebrating industry self-regulation, but began to acknowledge the reality of 
the need for government involvement to balance the interests of the industry.186 
Among his opening remarks: “I have no hesitation in discussing these questions, 
because, as I have said, the more the industry can solve for itself the less will be 
the burden on the Government and the greater will be the freedom of the 
industry in its own development.”187 This is also where Hoover began to make 
the case for technological supremacy. He laid out the costs of operating a 
broadcast station and suggested that any limitations on broadcasting would 
preclude these well-financed stations from being economically successful. It is 
here that his conception of the public interest begins to shift when he suggests 
that the public is best served by the “best stations,” that is, the stations with the 
most money and best equipment: “If we impose more division of time than at 
present, we shall drive the best stations out of action, and the public will be more 
poorly served. The choice is between public interest and private desire, and we 
                                                        
186 Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for Regulation of 
Radio, November 9-11, 1925, in RADIO CONTROL: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE, 69TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, 50-58 (1926).  
187 Id. at 53. 
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need not hesitate in making a decision.”188 Hoover’s distinction between the 
public interest and private desire set up a telling dichotomy. The “public 
interest” was now being used as part of the market rhetoric that would come to 
dominate radio regulation. In this context, the public interest reflected a defense 
of the market, gently regulated by government to make sure the dominant 
players would all get a share. In other words, the appeal to the public good was 
now code for letting the dominant broadcasters monopolize the airwaves but 
only because it was in the interest of the broader community and certainly not 
because it would serve individual self-interest. 
In this context, Hoover would go on to make other now-famous 
statements. This where he said, for example, “The ether is a public medium, and 
its use must be for public benefit. The use of a radio channel is justified only if 
there is public benefit.”189 His public interest rhetoric grew increasingly vague, 
and perhaps began at this point to take on the pro-industry connotation that 
would be ascribed to it in the 1927 Radio Act. He said: 
 
I can see no alternative to abandonment of the present system, which 
gives the broadcasting privilege to everyone who can raise the funds 
necessary to erect a station, irrespective of his motive, the service he 
proposes to render, or the number of others already serving his 
                                                        
188 Id. at 55. 
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community. Moreover, we should not freeze the present users of wave 
lengths permanently in their favored positions irrespective of their 
service. That would confer a monopoly of a channel in the air and deprive 
us of public control over it. It would destroy the public assurance that it 
will be used for public benefit. There are, indeed, many difficult issues to 
be solved, but we have to face them just the same.190  
 
The third and fourth radio conferences established a number of committees 
assigned to different tasks, including allocation of spectrum, advertising, 
licenses, marine, amateurs, interference and copyright. At the fourth conference, 
one committee was tasked with developing legislation and, in its remarks, drew, 
perhaps for the first time, a clear distinction between broadcasting and public 
utility service, saying that “recognition of the principle of public benefit does not 
bring the broadcasting stations into the category of recognized public utilities.” 
191 
Add to this defense of the commercial broadcasters the very first 
resolution appearing in the 1925 conference proceedings. Paul B. Klugh, the 
executive chairman of the National Association of Broadcasters, proposed that 
the basis of legislation “should be convenience and necessity, combined with 
fitness and ability to serve, and due consideration should be given to existing 
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stations and the services which they have established.”192 Policy scripts were 
being written by the very industry that was to be regulated. “Fitness and ability 
to serve” and “due consideration for existing stations” would become central to 
the meaning of the public interest along with “convenience and necessity” as the 
impending legislation was crafted.  
The central alternative to this approach was reflected in the conference 
proceedings by Harry J.C. Umberger of Kansas State College, who called for 
provisions for the many state and public departments and universities that were 
already making good use of the airwaves. Umberger presented a resolution on 
behalf of the Department of Agriculture, farmers, and agricultural colleges using 
radio. He highlighted radio’s power to educate and produce public service 
programs, which would be especially beneficial in rural areas.193 If the “public 
interest” had any meaning at all, surely it was reflected in this proposal, which 
emphasized service to the public but died in a technical committee. As Rowland 
concludes, “As the public interest standard was being adopted in the principal 
forum where private and public interests were being authoritatively welcomed 
and their results officially sanctioned, the public service notion of broadcasting, a 
model that would appear to have been central to the public interest, was being 
systematically ignored.”194  
                                                        
192 Id. at 59. 
193 Id. at 60. 
194 Rowland, supra note 166, at 373. 
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Meanwhile, the Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station195 case, which 
relied on a common law property rights solution at the state level, showed a 
possible alternative to Hoover’s preferred method of regulation, and Congress 
had to act quickly to make sure this alternative did not take root.196 “That the 
political marketplace pointedly vetoed a property rights solution that would 
bypass regulators and legislators while holding entry open into broadcasting 
was not a reflection of technical incompetence but of self-interested 
rationality,”197 Thomas Hazlett wrote. American policymakers knew what they 
were doing when they instituted their preferred solution, a complex power-
sharing arrangement between government and industry, Hazlett suggested. 
In sum, the Fourth National Radio Conference and the mid-1920s 
generally marked the shift of the meaning of the public interest to give it a clear 
pro-industry connotation, to divorce broadcasting from any notion of public 
utility service, and to establish a preference for existing commercial broadcasters 
who already possessed the technology necessary to provide a national 
broadcasting service. By delaying legislation in its hesitancy to restrict private 
business, Congress allowed time for the dominant commercial broadcasters to 
gain power over the Navy, the post office and amateurs.  Thus, the big 
                                                        
195 Gen. No. B-1 36,864 (1926) (Cook Co., Ill., Circ. Ill.).  
196 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J. 
OF L. & ECON. 133 (1990).  
197 Id. at 175. 
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communications corporations were poised to come out on top with the creation 
of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927. 
The mid-1920s had seen increasing chaos as amateurs and non-corporate 
broadcasters including universities, religious groups and labor organizations 
competed for the airwaves with the emerging commercial stations operated by 
private businesses. The messy situation finally came to a head when the 
government sued the Zenith Corporation for violating spectrum-use rules in its 
broadcasts and a district court found in 1926 that Secretary Hoover was in fact 
powerless to regulate broadcasting under the 1912 Radio Act. 198 This opinion 
was confirmed by the attorney general, who wrote, “[T]he present legislation is 
inadequate to cover the art of broadcasting, which has been almost entirely 
developed since the passage of the 1912 Act. If the present situation requires 
control, I can only suggest that it be sought in new legislation, carefully adapted 
to meet the needs of both the present and the future.”199 In this context, Congress 
would finally decide to act.  
 
THE BIRTH OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING COMPANY 
                                                        
198 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926). 
199 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126 (1926) (reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 27-
31 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 1984). 
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At the start of the 1920s, Britain had not yet decided what path its 
broadcasting system would take.200 As in the United States, Britain had instituted 
a ban on amateur radio during the first world war, and as in the United States, 
the ban was lifted in 1919. As amateur operators resumed their work, the 
realization that broadcasting regular entertainment over the airwaves could 
stimulate the sale of wireless receivers came to British radio manufacturers, just 
as it had in the U.S. But the U.S. radio companies had become more 
technologically advanced than British Marconi and the other British 
manufacturers, possibly because the U.S. had lost less time to the war. 
“America’s lead time was envied in Britain and quickened the pace of 
development in Britain, but the use made by American broadcasters of their lead 
served as a warning rather than an example,”201 Asa Briggs wrote. Perhaps the 
British system was slow to catch up, but this may have been an advantage in that 
it gave regulators more time to observe what was happening in the United States 
and to think about how to approach the new technology.  
 Still, commercial pressures did exist in Britain, and the broadcasting boom 
in the United States didn’t help. After the war, the national security argument for 
government control of broadcasting gave way to pressure from wireless 
manufacturers and amateur radio operators to authorize a regular broadcasting 
                                                        
200 This history is based on BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 36-58; CRISELL, supra note 110, at 17-
20. 
201 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 59-60. 
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service.202 As a result, the post office allowed the Marconi Company to broadcast 
from a sole transmitter at Writtle near Chelmsford but warned them not to 
encroach on military transmissions. The Post Office eventually allowed a few 
other stations to broadcast but never granted any official, permanent licenses to 
operate due to the unresolved question of how to deal with the technological 
problem of spectrum scarcity, the limited availability of frequencies on which to 
broadcast. The Marconi Company began experimental broadcasting in February 
1920, but did not begin a regular broadcasting service until February 14, 1922, a 
full year-and-a-half after the first KDKA broadcast in the United States Marconi’s 
London station, 2LO, began broadcasting — under major restrictions — on May 
11, 1922. Other radio manufacturers soon began to show interest. At that point, 
the post office, “[A]nxious to avoid the chaos that had arisen from unrestrained 
broadcasting in the United States and unwilling to have to arbitrate between 
rival interests in the British radio industry,” negotiated the formation of a cartel 
of the radio manufacturers.203 In the spring of 1922, discussions between the 
various radio manufacturers and the post office led to the formation of the 
British Broadcasting Company. (It would remain a “company” until it became 
the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1927.) The Company began broadcasting 
on November 14, 1922, but did not receive an official license from the post office 
until January 18, 1923.  
                                                        
202 See CRISELL, supra note 110, at 14-20. 
203 SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 5. 
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 Before this could happen, though, a few decisions had to be made. F.J. 
Brown, an assistant secretary at the post office, had been visiting the United 
States and attended Hoover’s First National Radio Conference in early 1922. The 
lessons he learned about frequency chaos were apparent in a report made by the 
postmaster general in Parliament in 1922: 
 
…it would be impossible to have a large number of firms broadcasting. 
That is physically impossible. It would result in a sort of chaos, only in a 
much aggravated form than that which has arisen in the United States of 
America, and which has compelled the United States, or the Department 
over which Mr. Hoover presides, and who is responsible for broadcasting, 
to do what we are now doing at the beginning, that is, proceed to lay 
down very drastic regulations, indeed, for the control of wireless 
broadcasting.204 
 
Thus, when the post office received twenty new applications for permission to 
broadcast in the spring of 1922, the reply was always “the ether is already 
full.”205 In the sense of closing the ether, Britain’s post office was a full year 
ahead of Hoover’s commerce department. Instead of the indiscriminate granting 
of licenses, the British Postmaster General F.G. Kellaway told Parliament that he 
                                                        
204 HC Hansard Deb 04 August 1922 vol 157 cc1951-75, 1956.  
205 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 85. 
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would “ask all those who apply — the various firms who have applied — to 
come together at the Post Office and co-operate so that an efficient service may 
be rendered and that there may be no danger of monopoly and that each service 
shall not be interfering with the efficient working of the other.”206 This early view 
expressed a concern for striking a balance between efficiency of service and 
maintaining equal barriers to entry. 
That same spring, the Wireless Sub-Committee of the Imperial 
Communications Committee began designing the strict set of controls that would 
govern operations of the British Broadcasting Company. By 1922, the syndicate 
of six private British companies had an effective monopoly over the airwaves, 
although “it was at first denied that the British Broadcasting Company was a 
monopoly, because entry into the company was allowed to any genuine British 
manufacturer in the radio industry.”207 Complaints about monopoly came mostly 
from the popular press, which thought radio would harm newspaper circulation.  
The Wireless Sub-Committee of the Imperial Communications Committee 
would eventually come up with a set of rules for broadcasting. The 
subcommittee set limits on the days and times that broadcasters could use the 
airwaves, it placed technical limitations on power and manner of transmissions, 
and it ruled that facilities “should be given to bona fide radio manufacturing 
companies to broadcast news and educational matter,” which then and later 
                                                        
206 Hansard, vol. 153, col. 1600, 4 May 1922. (quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 100). 
207 SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 6. 
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prevented applicants such as newspapers and retail stores from entering the 
industry.208 Furthermore, agreements between the post office and the 
manufacturers dictated that the original BBC would be funded by three sources: 
original stock, royalties on wireless sets sold by manufacturers, and receiving 
licenses collected by the post office from the public. These severe limitations on 
such important technical and financial questions provided a sharp contrast to the 
American approach, just as they were meant to do in light of the chaos in the 
United States. As Briggs noted, “American broadcasting had blundered into 
chaos: British broadcasting was to be forced into a strait-jacket.”209  
Unresolved matters remained related to questions of control of content. 
Postmaster General Kellaway had said that “there will be certain regulations in 
regard to the character and classes of news which these agencies will be allowed 
to transmit, but on that head I have not yet come to a final decision.”210 Kellaway 
avoided questions about censorship of content, but this early statement about 
“character and class” suggested the possibility of content control through some 
means and anticipated the leadership of John Reith.211 At the same time, at least 
part of Kellaway’s concern about “content” had to do with the calls from the 
British press that broadcasters should be restricted from producing original news 
                                                        
208 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 97. 
209 Id. at 98. 
210 Hansard, vol. 153, col. 1600, 4 May 1922 (quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 100). 
211 Id. 
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reports so as to minimize competition with the newspaper industry. Kellaway 
also had to contend with members of Parliament who attacked the emerging 
plan for broadcasting as monopolistic and in violation of free trade. He 
responded by saying that the post office’s approach actually promoted 
competition in broadcasting and would serve national business interests by 
restricting access by foreign radio manufacturers to Britain’s radio market.212  
Ultimately, Kellaway and the post office took their time in addressing these 
matters. “It was the concern of the post office with matters like these—matters 
which involved its conception of the ‘public interest’—which held back progress 
in the late summer and autumn of 1922,”213 Briggs wrote.  Kellaway wanted to 
ensure that the broadcasting service to emerge from the Post Office’s long 
deliberations would be one he would not have to defend to angry members of 
Parliament, the press, the broadcasters, the radio manufacturers, or the public.214 
He knew, whatever the outcome, he would be held responsible. 
 One month after the British Broadcasting Company began regular 
broadcasts, it hired a general manager named John Reith, a 34-year-old Scottish 
engineer who knew nothing about broadcasting but came highly 
recommended.215 Reith, from the start, had concluded that broadcasting was a 
                                                        
212 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 120-123. 
213 Id. at 123. 
214 See BRIGGS, supra note 16, 120-123. 
215 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 135. 
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“precious national resource — too precious to be used merely to deliver 
audiences to advertisers or even to wireless manufacturers.”216 Reith wanted the 
BBC to operate as a monopoly, remain institutionally independent, be funded by 
a license fee, be accessible to all, and maintain high standards.217 These 
characteristics were not simply the original thinking of Reith; they had 
organizational precedents in Britain in the context of the rise of the public 
corporation in the early 1900s.218 The forestry, gas, water and electricity 
industries had been organized as public corporations and designed to combine 
the best of civil and commercial values.219 Thus, the BBC already possessed some 
of these qualities before Reith’s arrival. The structures already in place, to some 
extent, dictated that the technology would eventually be organized as a public 
resource. The early shareholder rates of return were modest, and the companies 
were never driven primarily by profit. Perhaps most significant is the fact that 
the British government approved the licensing fee from the beginning to cushion 
the BBC from having to rely too heavily on profit.  
Considering all this, to say that the BBC began as a private company is 
somewhat misleading. The company was so heavily regulated by government 
that it was basically a public institution from the start, and much of its funding 
                                                        
216 CRISELL, supra note 110, at 18. 
217 Id. at 19. 
218 Id.  See also CURRAN & SEATON, supra note 50, at 105. 
219 CURRAN & SEATON, supra note 50, at 138-39. 
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came from royalties and licenses collected by government on the company’s 
behalf. All of this had happened somewhat haphazardly, largely in reaction to 
the perceived chaos in the United States. But as Paddy Scannell and David 
Cardiff and others argue, the initial goal was to create a market for the sale of 
radio receivers; the notion of broadcasting as a public service came later.220 
Notably, however, the public service concept did come, and it came even though 
there was no real need for it. The public service approach may have actually been 
detrimental to the demand for radio sets; perhaps an American-style, 
commercial, entertainment-oriented approach to broadcasting would have made 
radio in Britain all the more popular. But John Reith wouldn’t have it. Reith’s 
approach to public service broadcasting in 1924 had been informed and 
emboldened the year before by the work and report of The Broadcasting 
Committee, better known as the Sykes Committee, on which Reith served as a 
member.  
 
JOHN REITH AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
 It seems that Reith had a sense of the grandeur of what was about to 
happen. In an entry in his diary dated December 28, 1922, just a month-and-a-
half after his hiring, Reith wishes for his mother to live to see him made a 
knight.221 He continues: 
                                                        
220 SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 5. 
221 CHARLES STUART ED., THE REITH DIARIES 129 (1975). 
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I feel if this job succeeds and I am given grace to succeed in it, I might not 
be so far off this. I do want a title for dear Mother’s sake and Muriel’s [his 
wife] and other similar reasons. May I never forget dear Mother’s prayer. I 
must take Christ with me from the very beginning and all through this 
difficult work. I cannot succeed otherwise. “Without me ye can do 
nothing.” I can do all things through Christ.222  
 
In many ways, this sounds downright delusional. But he was not far off. This 
also makes clear how Reith would carry his strong religious background with 
him in his work at the BBC. As Briggs notes, “Reith’s whole conception of moral 
standards derived from Christian principles.”223 But these principles meant more 
to Reith than mere moralizing over the airwaves. They would inform his view of 
the public, of economics and of technology. 
 As Briggs points out, Reith never refers to “mass media” or “mass 
communication” in any of his writings. Instead he emphasizes the “public” or 
the “publics” as part of “the great audience,” not to be analyzed for tastes and 
preferences to be pandered to, but as humans in need of cultural enrichment and 
fulfillment.  Briggs writes: 
 
                                                        
222 Id. 
223 BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 272. 
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The “publics” are treated with respect not as nameless aggregates with 
statistically measurable preferences, “targets” for the programme sponsor, 
but as living audiences capable of growth and development. In other 
words, Reith’s theory of public service began with a conception of the 
public. Without such a conception the conception of public service itself 
becomes bleak and arid.224 
 
It is easy to imagine how this sort of approach would earn Reith charges of 
elitism and socialism, which he did not shy from. In his book Broadcast Over 
Britain, written hastily in 1924, Reith countered these charges with simple 
appeals to reason: “To disregard the spread of knowledge, with the consequent 
enlargement of opinion, and to be unable to supplement it with reasoned 
arguments, or to supply satisfactory answers to legitimate and intelligent 
questions, is not only dangerous but stupid.”225 Reith’s book, one of the most 
important documents in the history of broadcasting, expresses a bold vision for 
public service broadcasting and did much to influence the future of the BBC. It is 
important to note that Reith’s approach to public service broadcasting in 1924 
had been informed and emboldened the year before by the work and report of 
the Broadcasting Committee, better known as the Sykes Committee, on which 
Reith served as a member.  
                                                        
224 Id. at 239. 
225 JOHN C.W. REITH, BROADCAST OVER BRITAIN 19 (1924). 
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The Sykes Committee, named for its chairman Sir Frederick Sykes, was 
appointed by the postmaster general April 24, 1923, to consider “broadcasting in 
all its aspects” as well as “the action which should be taken upon the 
determination of the existing licence of the Broadcasting Company” and the 
“restrictions which may need to be placed upon its user or development.”226 The 
committee recognized the future importance of the new technology and began its 
work under the assumption that “the control of such a potential power over 
public opinion and the life of the nation ought to remain with the State, and that 
the operation of so important a national service ought not to be allowed to 
become an unrestricted commercial monopoly.”227 To this end, the committee 
declared the airwaves to be “regarded as a valuable form of public property; and 
the right to use them for any purpose should only be given after full and careful 
consideration.”228 The committee also recognized from the start that the outcome 
it recommended was likely to have a lasting effect, opening and closing certain 
alternative paths. The committee declared that any wavelengths “assigned to any 
particular interest should be subject to the safeguards necessary to protect the 
public interest in the future. Should readjustments become necessary after 
definite allocations of the national property, they may be found both difficult and 
                                                        
226 SYKES COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE BROADCASTING COMMITTEE (Cd. 1951) 5 (1923).   
227 Id. at 6. 
228 Id.  
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costly.”229 Indeed, exit costs are central to the concept of path dependence and 
explain why it is hard to stray from chosen paths. These costs can be material or 
nonmaterial, as is the case with the inefficient QWERTY keyboard still used. In 
the case of broadcasting, substantial costs, both material and nonmaterial, would 
be involved in attempts to alter future paths in both Britain and the United 
States. 
Due to the provisional nature of the agreements governing British 
broadcasting, the Sykes Committee was asked to respond to the original license 
granted to the British Broadcasting Company in January 1923.230 The license 
outlined all the ways in which the Company was already operating like a public 
monopoly.231 Manufacturers had to pay to join and be approved by the 
postmaster general. The post office issued broadcast receiving licenses and sets 
were marked “BBC — Type approved by Postmaster General.” The post office 
paid the Company half of the licensing fees received. And receiving sets had to 
be British-made and carry a tax payment to the company as approved by the 
postmaster general. Furthermore, no “advertising or paid matter” was to be 
broadcast, and “only such news as is obtained from news agencies approved by 
                                                        
229 Id.  
230 Wireless Broadcasting Licence (Cmd. 1822) (1923).  
231 The “outline of the existing scheme” is summarized in Sykes Committee, supra note 
226, at 8-9. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
82 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
the Postmaster General” was allowed. The Company also was “not to pay 
dividends at a higher rate than 7.5 per cent per annum.”232  
It is fine to say that technical restrictions on wavelengths and policies 
regarding Company organization were due to the limited nature of the airwaves, 
or at least the current understanding of the airwaves at the time. And the 
restrictions on types of radio sets to be used and the requirement of receiving 
licenses were certainly meant to help national industry and increase revenue for 
the post office. But the restrictions on content — certain types of news and 
advertising — reflect different interests. The limits on news broadcasts and 
advertising were meant to protect the publishing industry, although these 
restrictions on news would loosen throughout the decade, partly due to Reith’s 
insistence. As Scannell and Cardiff note: “The restrictive attitude of the Post 
Office which, at the time, had forbidden the BBC to deal with any matters of 
public controversy, was severely restricting the development of this side of 
broadcasting, and Reith sharply criticized the shackles imposed on radio’s 
treatment of news and politics.”233 
The restrictions on advertising, however, reflect perhaps the biggest 
difference between the British and American approaches to broadcasting. 
Beyond protecting newspapers, the Sykes Committee feared that advertising 
                                                        
232 Sykes Committee, supra note 226, at 9. 
233 SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 8. 
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would lead to lower standards and make the service unpopular.234 The 
Committee reports that it would be permissible to accept the “gift” of a concert 
and broadcast the name of the donor, or to name the publisher and price of a 
song to be played. It also ruled on the “Broadcasting of Commercial 
Information,” saying “this would be permitted if extra revenue is needed, but 
limited to a block of five minutes per hour, for example, and under suitable 
safeguards.”235 These sorts of declarations, coming from the mainstream 
policymakers, were unlike what was happening in the United States in 1923. 
Although Hoover had claimed to be opposed to advertising — it was 
“inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for service…to be 
drowned in advertising chatter,” He declared at the first radio conference in 
1922236 — this grand rhetoric never worked itself into any specific 
recommendations or requirements as it would in Britain. 
One reason for this was that radio in the United States had developed so 
quickly and with so little regulatory authority that there had been no time to 
implement an organized, universal approach to financing broadcasting. Britain’s 
slightly late arrival to the radio craze gave it a great advantage in this regard. The 
aims of the original British approach to radio had been “to secure the early 
establishment of an efficient and attractive broadcasting service without cost to 
                                                        
234 Sykes Committee, supra note 226, at 19. 
235 Id. at 19-20. 
236 HOOVER, supra note 168, at 140. 
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the taxpayer and without the establishment of any manufacturing monopoly,”237 
and the outcome in 1923 was thought by many to have actually achieved this 
goal. The Company was a consortium of manufacturers rather than a monopoly 
of one, and the cost for broadcasting was paid by the end user in the form of the 
radio license. Barring the early introduction of such a licensing scheme, it would 
be difficult to implement such an approach later. The committee’s approach to 
the funding model, while resting on “the educative value of broadcasting,”238 
precluded a tax on the general population. Instead, the committee approved of 
the licensing fee approach and recommended that “the Government should not 
aim at making a profit on the control of the service or the licensing of wireless 
sets.”239 
It is worth noting that some Britons evaded the licensing fee by building 
their own sets. The promise had been made in the House of Commons in July 
1922 that “amateurs who construct their own receiving sets…will be allowed to 
use them.” It was  
 
[T]he view then taken by the Post Office being that if an applicant were 
sufficiently skilled to make his own apparatus he would have sufficient 
knowledge to make proper use of an experimental license, which is free of 
                                                        
237 Sykes Committee, supra note 226, at 10. 
238 Id. at 17. 
239 Id.  
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the restriction inserted in the broadcasting license as to the type of 
apparatus.240  
 
Based on this early promise, radio parts, both domestic and foreign-made, began 
to appear on the market, undermining the official Company sets, because 
homemade sets were cheaper. Ultimately, “[T]he Post Office agreed in January, 
1923, to issue experimental licenses only to persons with unquestionable 
qualifications, the applications from other persons being held over for further 
consideration.”241 They discussed the possibility of a “constructor’s” license for 
those who wanted to use homemade sets, but this never became a reality, as the 
post office and the Company could never come to an agreement on the 
conditions under which such a license would be issued. 
This problem was indicative of one of the central objections to the scheme 
thus far. The Sykes Committee noted that these objections centered on the 
notions that it was wrong to control the manufacture and importation of wireless 
apparatus, and that firms had to join the Company in order to manufacture and 
sell apparatus. It was wrong that “the Company is practically controlled by a few 
large firms, who, it is suggested, are placed in a position of advantage over 
smaller trade rivals,” and “certain conditions of the agreement which members 
of the British Broadcasting Company have to sign are of an oppressive character 
                                                        
240 Id. at 9. 
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or give the Company powers which might be used harshly.”242 Despite these 
objections, the Sykes Committee did not hesitate to recommend “that permission 
to transmit, and the matter to be transmitted, should be subject to public 
authority.”243 That the Committee would include the “matter to be transmitted” 
was an early indication that someone would be in charge of the content of 
broadcasting. The Committee proposed a broadcasting board to work out the 
details in conjunction with the post office. 
As to the question of state operation, the Sykes Committee recognized that 
“once the principle of public control is established, it is evident that considerable 
latitude is possible in deciding by whom broadcasting should be operated.”244 
The committee recognized that the actual operation of so important a national 
service “should be in the hands of the Government rather than in private 
hands.”245 On the other hand, the committee also recognized that government 
would not be suited to handle entertainment programming and that it would be 
subject to criticism regarding political power and influence. The government-
controlled operation “would be constantly open to suspicion that it was using its 
unique opportunities to advance the interests of the political party in power; and, 
in the endeavour to avoid anything in the slightest degree controversial, it would 
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probably succeed in making its service intolerably dull.”246 Ultimately the 
committee’s recommendation favored state control but noted that “care should 
be taken to interfere as little as possible with the broadcast programming.”247 
 The committee’s final recommendation was the creation of the 
Broadcasting Board to assist the postmaster general, noting that “the 
broadcasting service should not be operated by a Government Department, but 
that those entrusted with the service should work under Governmental 
licence.”248 This recommendation was in keeping with the scheme established 
under the original Company license but suggested and anticipated the 
transformation of the Company into a public corporation. It is significant that 
although these recommendations in the interest of public service originated with 
the British government, they were realized by the broadcasters themselves. As 
Scannell and Cardiff note, this  
 
[D]efinition of broadcasting as a public utility to be developed as a 
national service in the public interest came from the state. The 
interpretation of that definition, the effort to realize its meaning in the 
development of a programme service guided by considerations of national 
                                                        
246 Id. at 14. 
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service and the public interest, came from the broadcasters and above all 
from John Reith.249 
 
Reith’s vision was informed by his desire to use the new technology to serve the 
public by encouraging widespread access to knowledge and culture.  
Reith was eager to promote his cause and to defend his approach in the 
face of criticisms of the elitist monopoly. “I think it will be admitted by all that to 
have exploited so great a scientific invention for the purpose and pursuit of 
entertainment alone would have been a prostitution of its powers and an insult 
to the character and intelligence of the people,”250 he wrote.  He also specifically 
characterized the Company as a utility and emphasized its non-profit nature: 
“The Company operates as a public utility service, and it is of great importance 
that this should be definitely recognized. In other words, the Company is not out 
to make money for the sake of making money; by its constitution it is debarred 
from doing so.”251 Furthermore, Reith argued that a broadcasting service that 
operated in this manner would actually benefit British industry rather than 
detract from it. “In this business, the interests of the public and the interests of 
the trade happen to be identical, even though this may not be apparent at first 
sight,” he wrote.  “The greater the extent to which, as a public service, the 
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250 REITH, supra note 225, at 17. 
251 Id. at 57. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
89 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
Company is able to give satisfaction, the greater the benefit to the new British 
industry.”252 He also dismissed monopoly concerns by noting that “unity of 
control” was essential “in a concern where expansion is so rapid and the 
problems so unique.”253 Reith had always preferred the term “unified control” 
over “monopoly,” which he avoided using. Finally, he compared the British 
system to the American approach, pointing out that the delay in initiating a 
broadcasting service in Britain served the country well: 
 
In America broadcasting had been initiated more than a year earlier than 
in this country; with characteristic energy it had been developed 
wholesale, largely on a commercial basis, and without any method of 
control whatsoever. There is no co-ordination, no standard, no guiding 
policy; advertising, direct or indirect, is usually the sole means of revenue. 
I gather from many American visitors that they consider that the delay 
which took place before a service was begun in this country, is more than 
justified by the progress subsequently made. There is scarcely a civilized 
country of which representatives have not visited us, usually staying for a 
period, to absorb something of the procedure and methods of operation. 
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253 Id. at 70. 
The Closing of the Ether 
 
90 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis, 
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136 
 
We are always glad to see them. We make no copyright of our experience, 
however valuable or unique it may be.254 
 
By the mid-1920s, Reith and the Company were facing less and less resistance as 
their approach became more and more accepted throughout Britain. For 
example, an article in The Times was indicative of the realization that the 
monopoly approach was preferable to American-style competition. 
 
But in this case we have to consider the alternative to monopoly: it would 
be, almost certainly, confusion, and quite certainly the debasement of an 
influence far too permeating to be allowed to be vulgarized….It is now a 
monopoly, but in generous and humane hands the interest of the majority 
will probably be in its continuing to be a monopoly.255 
 
As this consensus grew, the transformation of the BBC from Company to 
Corporation came closer. 
 
THE CRAWFORD COMMITTEE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BBC 
Radio in Britain was exploding throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1923, 
the post office issued 80,000 receiving licenses. In 1924, it issued one million. And 
                                                        
254 Id. at 81. 
255 THE TIMES, Nov. 15, 1924 (quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 329). 
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by 1939, the number was nine million.256 Between 1922 and 1924, nine main 
stations and ten relay stations had been set up in England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and they reached nearly 80% of the population.257 Despite this 
growth, in the mid-1920s, there was no discussion in Parliament of major matters 
of broadcast policy until late 1926. Rather, Parliament was concerned with setting 
up the Empire Wireless Communications Network.258 One notable policy change 
was that the embargo against foreign radio receivers was dropped as of 
December 31, 1924, because the post office had switched to a single form of 
receiving license for all types of equipment. As early as 1923, however, the 
postmaster general had already appointed another committee to review the 
BBC’s finances.  
As early as 1923, the postmaster general had already appointed another 
committee to review the BBC’s finances. This second broadcasting committee, 
known as the “Crawford Committee” after the chairman, met in 1925 and made 
its report in 1926. The goal was “to advise as to the proper scope of the 
Broadcasting service and as to the management, control and finance thereof” 
after the expiration of the existing Company license, which was set to end on 
                                                        
256 See CRISELL, supra note 110, at 22-24. 
257 See SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 15. 
258 Id. at 23. 
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December 31, 1926.259 Much like the Sykes Committee, the Crawford Committee 
recognized the public service role of broadcasting and rejected advertising on the 
grounds that it would lead to lower standards. Monopoly was advocated as an 
efficient way to provide successful service and a way to ensure quality 
programming. As Valeria Camporesi notes, “Broadcasting had come to be 
viewed as too delicate a matter to be left to the market.”260 Not only did the 
committee believe that “competition for listeners would force down program 
standards,” as Paulu notes, but it was operating in a context where government 
monopoly “was strongly supported by the articulate public of that day.”261  
 Ultimately, there would be no major opposition to the change to public 
corporation, which was meant to solidify the monopoly and protect it from both 
political and commercial influence by changing it from a regulated private entity 
to a government-owned operation protected by royal charter. The post office was 
supportive of the change, as was public opinion.262 The committee recommended 
the single licensing fee of 10 shillings, and 75% was to go to the BBC.263 It also 
                                                        
259 CRAWFORD COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE BROADCASTING COMMITTEE, 1925 (Cmd. 2599) 2 
(1926).   
260 VALERIA CAMPORESI, MASS CULTURE AND NATIONAL TRADITIONS: THE BBC AND 
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261 PAULU, supra note 45, at 14. 
262 See SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 8-9. 
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recommended that wireless receiver royalty payments to radio manufacturers 
should stop. The licensing system remained problematic, however, as the post 
office didn’t want to collect fees on behalf of a private company. Reith 
maintained that broadcasting was a public service, and that the public should 
pay for it, not advertisers.264 This led Reith and the Crawford Committee to 
advocate for making the BBC a public corporation. The British government was 
sympathetic, as this institutional model was now popular and widely 
accepted.265 
 Like the Sykes Committee, the Crawford Committee reported that it was 
“deeply conscious of the magnitude of the issues involved — not merely as 
regards their scientific or mechanical aspects, but still more in relation to their 
ultimate impact on the education and temperament of the country.”266 As before, 
the Crawford Committee maintained that the “United States system of free and 
uncontrolled transmission and reception, is unsuited to this country, and that 
Broadcasting must accordingly remain a monopoly — in other words that the 
whole organization must be controlled by a single authority.”267 The committee 
recommended against the continuation of the current Company license and 
instead advocated for a public corporation form of organization. A central reason 
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for this was to insulate the operations of the broadcasting service from politics 
and to provide leeway in selecting content. “Such an authority would enjoy a 
freedom and flexibility which a Minister of State himself could scarcely exercise 
in arranging for performers and programmes, and in studying the variable 
demands of public taste and necessity,”268 it reported.  
Furthermore, the committee recommended that the commissioners of the 
new corporation “should be persons of judgment and independence, free of 
commitments, and that they will inspire confidence by having no other interests 
to promote than those of the public service. We hope they will be men and 
women of business acumen and experienced in affairs.”269 The committee was 
clear that it was authorizing a monopoly “vested by Statute in the whole 
Community,” and said that in this context, “the State safeguards the listener 
against exploitation; takes steps to maintain the efficiency of the service, and also 
exercises its regulative powers without which broadcasting would be thrown 
into chaos.”270 Looking to the future, the committee noted that they could not 
predict the future of broadcasting and envisioned two different possible 
outcomes. “On the one hand it is conceivable that Broadcasting might have to 
become a department of State like the telephone service: on the other it is 
possible that its character as a monopoly might have to disappear, and that the 
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rights of transmitting should be distributed.”271 In the latter possibility, the 
Crawford Committee anticipated correctly that competition would eventually be 
introduced to British broadcasting. 
 Although Reith was not a member of the Crawford Committee, he and the 
committee shared the same vision for broadcasting, and the committee stressed 
the educative value of radio. The committee called for the maintenance of high 
standards and praised the BBC for having “held the balance between conflicting 
tastes with discretion.” The committee recommended that listeners be afforded 
“latitude” in available content. “He must not be pressed to assimilate too much 
of what he calls ‘highbrow’ broadcast, and the Commissioners would not be wise 
in transmitting more educational matter than licensees are prepared to accept. At 
the same time every effort must be made to raise the standard of style and 
performance.”272 In many ways, Reith and the BBC would inform if not create 
the normative roles not just of broadcasting but modern journalism in general, 
especially as the BBC began to broadcast more news and public affairs programs 
in the late 1920s and 1930s. It is certainly remarkable that Reith would eventually 
institute at the BBC the types of goals and norms that would be celebrated and 
codified in the decades to come, for example, in the Pilkington Report and 
Hutchins Commission. It is worth noting that these norms were largely possible 
because of the unique structure of the organization, which “depended on the 
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rejection of both market forces and politics in favour of efficiency and planned 
growth by experts.”273  
A problem arose, however, with the 1926 general strike in Britain, during 
which questions arose about how a public broadcasting system would cover the 
actions of government.274 Some in government, including Winston Churchill, had 
growing concerned about seditious speech and wanted to commandeer 
broadcasting altogether but were prevented from doing so.  As Brian McNair 
wrote:  
 
During the 1926 General Strike Winston Churchill, then the Home 
Secretary, wanted to take direct control of the BBC and use it openly as a 
propaganda tool. He was overruled in government by those who argued 
that this would undermine the very thing which made the BBC a valuable 
ideological weapon—its perceived independence.275  
 
This does not mean the BBC went without being criticized, for many believed 
that the government had exercised some control over coverage of the strike.276 
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“Even if it proved possible — thanks largely to the licence fee — to resist the 
identification of the BBC with a department of State,” Krishan Kuman wrote, 
“there persisted the vexing association of ‘public service’ with service to the State 
seen as the embodiment of the national or public interest.”277  
The early BBC tended to avoid politics, especially in light of restrictions on 
news content that were only gradually lifted. In fact, this may have been one of 
the reasons the organization was successful. This was partly due to Reith’s own 
predisposition against politics in favor of other fare. As Kuman notes: 
 
The early BBC dealt with the problem by avoiding it. Reith despised 
politics and politicians, and sought to maintain the BBC’s independence 
by ignoring the contentious and, to him, sterile realm of political 
debate….This left the BBC free to get on with what Reith considered the 
important talks: building it up as a cultural church. Politics did not matter: 
philosophy, religion, music, poetry and drama — laced with ‘light 
entertainment’ as ground-bait — did.278 
 
The BBC was widely praised for its attention to these sorts of cultural affairs. At 
the same time, the notion of the early BBC as an immediately hailed cultural 
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institution speaking for the masses has been challenged. “Its relative newness, its 
conception of its role as the guardian of high culture and morality, its self-
denying ordinances against dealing with ‘controversial’ matters, all militated 
against a true involvement with the deeper and more varied levels of the 
society,”279 Kuman wrote. 
But others point out that the BBC’s service of high culture was not a new 
idea in Britain, and this is the reason the broadcasting service was successful. 
Reith and company were really just riding on the coattails of the success of the 
Victorian middle class, which brought the ideal of service to the forefront in late 
nineteenth century Britain, as Raymond Williams first suggested. Referencing 
Williams, Scannell and Cardiff write: “The Victorian reforming ideal of service 
was animated by a sense of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the 
community, aimed particularly at those most in need of reforming — the lower 
classes.”280 Indeed, the motivation behind the ideal of service wasn’t always so 
altruistic, and this is where the BBC earned its reputation as a hegemonic cultural 
dictator. Referencing Culture and Anarchy by Matthew Arnold, Scannell and 
Cardiff explain the nineteenth-century political motivations for “civilizing” the 
masses and “incorporating the working classes within the existing social and 
political order, and thus preventing the threat of revolt from below.”281 Whether 
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oppressing the masses through cultural hegemony or destroying culture though 
standardization and democratization, the BBC was always doing something 
wrong in eyes of many cultural critics. But somehow, it still survived, and 
Scannell and Cardiff attribute this to the non-commercial nature of the BBC: “If 
broadcasting in Britain emerged relatively unscathed from such withering 
criticism it was because the BBC, like the cultural critics, rejected the profit 
motive as the basis of its institutional existence.”282 Finally something to agree 
on.  
Ultimately, at the close of 1926, the British government accepted the 
recommendations of Reith and the Crawford Committee, and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation was born. Unlike the messy, chaotic situation in the 
United States, the British approach was more measured and restrictive of private 
enterprise. The fact that John Reith and the early British Broadcasting Company 
were so perfectly in tune with so many British cultural elites in and out of 
government was the main reason for their success. Most Britons, viewing the 
American approach to broadcasting as a cautionary tale, were pleased with the 
British use of the airwaves and were supportive of the institutionalization of the 
BBC as a public corporation operating what had been conceived of in Britain as a 
natural monopoly and a public service. While government control of such 
services was not unheard of in the U.S., it was far more likely to be accepted in 
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Britain due to a history of public control of such aspects of industry, such as the 
telegraph. Thus, path-dependent processes continued to shape the role of the 
state in the market and society. Causal chains that had been broken in the 1920s 
were beginning to reform as the critical juncture was coming to a close. The main 
difference seems to be that the chains were broken much longer in the United 
States as debate ensued and interests collided throughout the 1920s. For Britain 
and the BBC, the period of greatest contingency appeared to be at the start of the 
1920s before the original Company was formed. The early decision to form a 
heavily regulated monopoly followed by the success of Reith did much to push 
aside open competition as a policy alternative. In the United States, it was just 
the opposite: public ownership and control was pushed aside as communication 
companies were given time to dominate broadcasting in fact if not yet in law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This comparative analysis of path-dependent processes reveals that the 
eventual, divergent broadcasting policy outcomes in the United States and Great 
Britain, far from being inevitable, were contingent on different understandings of 
the public interest. In Britain, the public interest remained tied to earlier notions 
of public service, which suggested a regulatory approach that would treat 
broadcasting more like a public utility than a commodity to be bought and sold. 
In the United States, the public interest over time became wedded to notions of 
technological efficiency and economic consumption that gave preference to the 
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dominant commercial broadcasters and their advertising-supported networks. 
Independently, these findings are not terribly surprising, given that they are 
consistent with previous research. But the comparative approach used here and 
the attention to path-dependent processes helps this article achieve its goal of 
highlighting and explaining the different causes and conditions that led to 
divergent outcomes.  
Thus, this study has attempted to make three contributions to the existing 
literature. First, by employing a comparative approach, this work gains 
comparative leverage that helps to identify the differences in the regulatory 
approaches taken in the United States and Britain. Second, by taking a long view 
and focusing on institutional development and path-dependent processes, this 
work has identified the different trajectories and paths not taken that led to the 
divergent outcomes. Third, this work has attempted to shed light on the tensions 
that arise between markets and society with attention to the role of the state in 
regulating communications in particular and industry in general.  
 First, comparative historical analysis is useful for examining social 
phenomena that occur in limited numbers and on large scales over long time 
frames. The historical development of broadcasting is this type of social 
phenomenon, and the comparative approach helps accentuate the differences in 
outcomes and their causes. Histories that focus exclusively or primarily on the 
origins of broadcasting in a single country are limited to the debates and 
deliberations that took place in the country being investigated. This study gains 
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comparative leverage by contrasting the private, commercial, advertising-
supported system of broadcasting that emerged in the United States with the 
noncommercial, public monopoly that dominated in Britain. The contrast 
emphasizes the point that the American outcome was far from inevitable and 
could have easily turned out different. This is also evident in the intense 
struggles to control and influence broadcasting policy between the Department 
of Commerce, the Navy, the Post Office, various members of Congress, the 
communications corporations that dominated private broadcasting, other private 
broadcasters such as universities, churches and political groups, and amateur 
operators and hobbyists. These American struggles contrast sharply with the 
comparatively stable regulatory approach in Britain beginning with the birth of 
the British Broadcasting Company in 1922.  
 Second, the historical comparison highlights the path-dependent 
processes that led to these divergent outcomes. The long tradition of government 
control of communications in Britain stands apart from the American tendency to 
promote private entrepreneurialism and technological innovation that led to the 
massive growth of radio in the United States. These different regulatory 
approaches were informed by increasingly different conceptions of the public 
interest in the two countries beginning in the nineteenth century. While it is 
important to “break the chain” of path dependence in order to avoid the problem 
of infinite regress, the development of electric communication, particularly the 
telegraph, in the 1800s represents an earlier critical juncture with clear path-
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dependent outcomes in both countries. The outcomes for broadcasting were 
never guaranteed, but forces of inertia helped to perpetuate policy scripts that 
would limit private business in Britain and support it in the United States. 
Furthermore, the temporal sequencing of the development of 
broadcasting suggests that the United States, in that it was first in developing 
radio, served as a cautionary tale in Britain. This is interesting not just because 
the timing helped to dictate the outcome but also because the British reacted by 
deciding that the American chaos was unacceptable. The acceptability of the 
chaos in the United States and not in Britain speaks to the different views of the 
role of the state in society generally in allowing or restricting individual self-
interest. Failures to understand the technology aside, the individualistic nature of 
the race to develop radio despite the chaos it produced was an acceptable 
tradeoff in the United States, where regulatory intervention giving preference to 
industry was generally favored over the more citizen-oriented British approach. 
What if the causes of the different policy outcomes had been different? 
What if World War I had further delayed American commercial development of 
radio and Britain had gone first? Given the tradition of British government 
regulation of communications, it seems likely that Britain would have pursued a 
BBC-type outcome even without the cautionary tale from America. Now 
consider the American alternative. What if control of radio had been handed to 
the post office or the Navy, both entirely possible outcomes before and after the 
first world war? It is easy to imagine a scenario where this would have led to a 
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system of government-controlled national radio, although this likely would have 
given way to a hybrid competition model much faster than it did in Britain. 
Third, the different policy causes and outcomes can be better understood 
and explained through sociological analysis, using such concepts as Polanyi’s 
double movement, which highlights the tendency to restrain growth in the face 
of social disruption. The different outcomes in communication policy speak to 
the stronger British tradition of restraining growth in the face of market 
expansion, especially compared to the United States, where growth and 
expansion have often been the central goal of policy. These differences can be 
thought of as an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain 
before it did in the United States. This speaks to fundamentally different 
approaches to the regulation of markets in order to ease the tensions created in 
society. The rise of markets and the capitalist ethic led to different attempts to 
balance individual interests with the interests of the community, and these 
understandings are reflected in the institutional structure of media.  
At the same time, there are a number of noteworthy similarities in the 
outcomes in U.S. and British broadcasting, and they can be tied to similar causes. 
The similarities between the two countries were noted earlier, and it is these 
basic similarities that help make the comparison possible. It is worth noting that 
both countries were sufficiently equipped to develop radio broadcasting at about 
the same time. Both countries created new systems of mass communication that 
brought media content into people’s homes, changing the way people received 
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and related to news, information and entertainment. Both countries elected to 
issue licenses and create some sort of regulatory structure; neither seriously 
considered a free market for spectrum or a complete government takeover. And, 
over time, both countries have adopted a hybrid model of public and private 
broadcasting, although the public media tradition remains far stronger in Britain. 
Finally, both of these systems, rather than being structured with a great 
deal of public input and consideration, were top-down systems, organized by 
powerful actors and imposed upon the masses by administrative bodies. Neither 
approach can hardly be considered democratic. This pattern is evident 
throughout the history of communication. In The Master Switch, Columbia 
University law professor Tim Wu, who coined the phrase “network neutrality,” 
describes what he calls “the Cycle,” or the process that occurs as a new 
communication technology becomes dominated by powerful actors. Simply put, 
it goes from an open to a closed system: 
 
History shows a typical progression of information technologies: from 
somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry; from jury-rigged contraption 
to slick production marvel; from a freely accessible channel to one strictly 
controlled by a single corporation or cartel — from open to closed system. 
It is a progression so common as to seem inevitable, though it would 
hardly have seemed so at the dawn of any of the past century’s 
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transformative technologies, whether telephony, radio, television, or 
film.283  
 
The development of broadcasting in both the United States and Britain seems to 
represent this process of the closing of a system, but the closed systems that 
resulted had very different aims.  
“The brute force of monopoly” was the language used by John Reith of 
the BBC to describe the manner by which the British broadcasting system came 
to be; if there is to be competition, he said, it will be for “cheapness, not 
goodness.”284 But Reith unapologetically resisted the democratization of 
broadcasting and fought charges of elitism and paternalism by saying he was 
justified in controlling the content of the media because he had benefited from 
the education and cultural enlightenment that he thought everyone should be 
able to access. The notion of “noblesse oblige” figures prominently in this 
approach, as well as Reith’s determination not to turn a resource as valuable as 
the airwaves over to commercial interests but rather to preserve the airwaves as 
a system of continuing education. This represents a fundamentally positive 
conception of liberty, which is used to justify government intervention in the 
marketplace to serve the public interest. 
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In America, the structure and regulation of broadcasting was more 
heavily influenced by the rise of capitalism in the mid-1800s as it took hold of 
American life; structures and institutions quickly emerged that made 
commercialization the dominant approach to regulating society. Faith in the 
democratic ideal encouraged the freedom of markets and a theoretically negative 
conception of liberty that limited government’s ability to interfere in business. To 
the contrary, however, government worked in many ways to structure society to 
serve markets and justified this as a different type of public interest.  
The British approach was far closer to what one would expect from a 
reasonable normative understanding of the public interest, in the sense that it 
serves the larger public good of improving the conditions of democracy and 
freedom. As Mike Feintuck argued, the public interest from a normative 
perspective can “be endowed with strong democratic credentials,” and “its 
adoption as an interpretive principle, emphasizing the value of equality of 
citizenship, within the legal and regulatory systems, is not only advisable, but 
necessary, in the protection of democratic values.”285 The evidence explored in 
this study suggests this type of normative definition was more fully embodied in 
the British approach to broadcasting. 
With regard to similarities and differences between U.S. and British 
broadcasting, it is important not to overstate the impact of path-dependent 
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processes and critical junctures in order to avoid an overly deterministic view. To 
the contrary, path dependence and critical junctures can be used to highlight the 
contingent nature of communication policy. The development of radio was at 
least part historical accident in that no one could have been sure what the 
technology would eventually become. It is for reasons like this that we must 
remember to look forward from the past rather than backward from the present 
when conducting historical analyses.  
Future research should continue to explore institutional origins of 
communication policy and structures, and scholars should continue to apply an 
interdisciplinary approach, making use of such tools as path dependence, 
historical comparison and sociological analysis. As Pierson notes, theoretical 
work on sources of institutional origins and change in general “continue to be 
sketchy at best,”286 so this is certainly an area of communication studies ripe for 
further exploration. More specifically, future studies should pay careful attention 
to the path-dependent processes of the early- and mid-1920s, as well as the 
debates that took place during this period about the role of the state in regulating 
communications in the United States. In general, future studies should continue 
to explore the types of media structures and institutions best suited to enhance 
democratic practices. There is a real need for increased discussion and evidence 
related to whether and how media, properly insulated from government and 
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commerce, can serve self-governing citizens better than market-based 
alternatives. The lessons of the 1920s broadcast policy debates, especially when 
viewed in a comparative context, still have much to teach us as we move forward 
in the digital age and attempt to find a balance between public benefit and 
private desire. 
